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It is elementary economic theory that, other things 
being equal, the greater the number of competing sellers , 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the 
opinion of the Court: 
At issue in this case is the 
legality under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 
1 U.S.C. § 1, of a marketing 
program adopted by Respondent 
Sylvania in 1962 in an effort to 
improve the sales of the television 
sets produced by its Home Entertainment 
' Products Division. ~Like most other ;. 
television manufacturers, Sylvania 
previously had used a "saturation" 
2. 
which the television sets were sold 
to independent or company-owned 
distributors who resold to a large 
and diverse group of retailers. 
Prompted by a decline in its share 
of the national market for television 
sets to a relatively insignificant 
one to two percent of the total, 
Sylvania conducted an intensive 
reassessment of its marketing 
strategy in 1962 and, as a result, 
adopted the "elbow room" policy 
challenged here. 
Under this revised marketing system, 
Sylvania phased out its wholesale 
distributors and substituted a 
3. 
through which television sets are 
sold directly to a smaller and more 
select group of franchised retailers. 
An acknowledged purpose of the change 
was to decrease the number of 
retailers selling Sylvania television 
sets in the hope of attracting the 
more aggressive and competent 
retailers thought necessary to the 
improvement of the company's market 
position. To this end, Sylvania 
limited the number of franchises 
granted for any given area , and 
sell ~ Sylvania products only from 




an area was made by Sylvania in 
" 
light of the success or failure of 
existing retailers in penetrating 
Although judgments of cause and 
effect are difficult, Sylvania's 
new policy appears to have been 
successful during the period at 
·a:., 
issue here. By 1965, with h market 
share ~·:::to::::.;:;:~ v~ percent, 
" 
Sylvania had become a significant 
factor in its industry, ranking as 
the nation's eighth largest manufac-




relationship between Sylvania and 
Petitioner Continental T.V., Inc. ll 
The "elbow room" policy had been 
in effect for some time when in 
May of 1964 Sylvania persuaded 
Continental, an established retailer 
of television sets in northern 
California, to become a franchised 
Sylvania retailer. 
relationship prospe~ ~ May 
of 1965~ontinental was one of 
the largest Sylvania retailers in 
the country, operating Sylvania 
franchises at eight locations in a 
number of northern Califnrni.:=~ f'nnnrit=>c:o 
6. 
~e~~&e in November ~ 1965 Sylvania 
terminated Continental's franchises -
surprisingly, the parties present 
~ 
~a~«GicaJl¥ contrasting versions of 
" 
the events leading up to the termination , 
M Qeft~iRoellL2r1 ' s ftdilCliise s. The 
-details of the actions and reactions 
of the parties were relevant primarily 
to the pendent California business 
torts claim brought by Continental 
but rejected by the jury. For purposes 
of our discussion of the Sherman Act 
issue before us, only a brief summary 
is necessary. 
Dissatisfied with its sales in the 
7. 
Brothers, an established San Francisco 
retailer of television sets, as et neol' 1\ 
Sylvafti~ retailer. Because the proposed 
location of the new franchise was 
approximately a mile from one of 
Continental's franchised locations, 
Continental protested ~e Syl¥~Ri a that 
the new franchise violated the "elbow 
room" policy. When Sylvania persisted 
in its plans, Continental cancelled 
a i&~!£ Sylvania order and placed a 
large order with Phillips, one of 
Sylvania's competitors. During this 
same period, Continental expressed a 
desire to open a store in Sacramento, 
California, a desire Sylvania attributes 
~k~ 
epiagee in San Francisco. 
8. 
Sylvania 
~QgiQea that the Sacramento market was 
1\ 
adequately served by the existing 
Sylvania retailer, Handy Andy, and 
denied Continental's request. In the 
face of this denial) Continental advised 
Sylvania in early September of 1965 that 
it was in the process of moving Sylvania 
merchandise from its San Jose, California, 
~~-ez.-4 ~ 
warehouse to a new location ~ it 
" 
had leased in Sacramento. Two weeks 
later, Sylvania's credit department 
reduced Continental's credit line from 
$300,000 to $50,000. Despite Sylvania's 
assertion that the credit decision 
was simply the culmination of a continuing 
9 . 
decision to Sylvania's effort to keep 
it out of the Sacramento market. In 
response to the reduction in credit 
and the generally deteriorating 
relations with Sylvania, Continental 
withheld all payments owing to Maguire, 
the company that h andled the credit 
arrangements between Sylvania and its 
retailers. After payments had been 
withheld for three weeks and at least 
$62,000 was due, Maguire repossessed 
the Sylvania merchandise in Continental's 
control and filed this action to 
collect the amounts due, including 
indebtedness accelerated because of 









Continental's antitrust and business 
t\ 
a • .;(.,~~~~ 
,) 
tort counterclaims ~ tried to a 
"' 
jury in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of 
California. The jury returned a verdict 
favor of Continental on the antitrust 
3/ 
issue- and in favor of Sylvania on the 
business torts issue. Oa-=the-antitrust--n-
~ issue now before us, Continental 
~a.-c: 'k # 17 H.~ t f£/',1-L / -r /'f 
t~a-e Sylvanici.SseouJ:>ed -an 
" 
~4:~ t-..1-& 
1·- • agreement ~ its retailers ~y 
r· 
y / '1 . 
el~Sylvania products only from 
the locations at which they were fran-
chised. Continental argued that Sylvania's 
adoption and enforcement of this locations 
11. 
before this Court turns on whether the 
District Court correctly instructed the 
-+~ -h. 
jury on the ~1 standard under § 1. 
1\ 
lf<_e_, ly;f'l ~ on the.. du:i~ion ,·n cch in,) 
{ The court rejected an instruction phrased 
in terms of the reasonableness of the 
challenged restraint, and instructed 
instead as follows: 
"Therefore, if you find by 
a preponderance of the evidence 
that Sylvania entered into a 
contract, combination or conspiracy 
with one or more of its dealers 
pursuant to which Sylvania exer-
cised dominion or control over 
the products sold to the dealer, 
after having parted with title 
and risk to the products, you 
must find any effort thereafter 
to restrict outlets or store 
locations from which its dealers 
resold the merchandise which they 
had purchased from Sylvania to 
be a violation of Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, regardless of 
12. 
of Appeals ~or the Ninth Circuit, 
arguing that the District Court's 
instruction on the locations policy 
was incorrect. A divided panel of 
the Court of Appeals affirmed in an 
unpublished opinion that was subsequently 
withdrawn when en bane consideration 
was granted. The Court of Appeals 
sitting en bane reversed the District 
~ 
Court by a divided vote, distinguishing 
" 
the present case from Schwinn and holding 
that the jury should have been instructed 
to consider the reasonableness of the 
locations policy under § l. Acknowledging 
that there is language in the Schwinn 
opinion that could be read to support 
13. 
present case could and should be 
distinguished from Schwinn: 
"Thus a critical and very obvious 
distinction between the restrictions 
in Schwinn and those of ~ylvania 
is that Schwinn involved a restric-
tion on the locations and types of 
permissible vendees, while Sylvania 
only imposed restrictions on the 
permissible locations of vendors. 
[I]t is clear to us that 'territory' 
and 'areas' refer to the location 
of vendees, rather than vendors." 
537 F.2d, at 990. 
Focusing on ~ exclusive distributor 
the court noted 
that intrabrand competition there was 
"wholly destroyed." 537 F.2d, at 990. 
The court found the locations policy 
I 
IAA/ 
of Sylvania to be J\ "marked contrast," 
because 
"Sylvania franchised at least 
14. 
purchaser of Sylvania products 
' 
a reasonable choice between 
several competing dealers." 
537 F.2d, at 990. 
The court embraced the above distinc-
~ tion because of its view th~rule 
illegality for a locations 
policy would be inconsistent with the 
policies underlying the Sherman Act 
and with numerous lower federal court 
decisions sustaining the same or similar 
restrictions under the familiar rule 
of reason standard of § 1 review. 
~bf diasenting membe~s ~urt 
~essed- theiE iews ~ two major 
1\ 
dissenting opinions. Judge Kilkenny 
argued at ~ome ben~h that the present 
Tr.&.,LJ- J~ U-J ~~;.,--:;;:] 
t,. c:,...- /;..,lAc I '1 
7 f 
/A /J 15. 
~...,.-;.. ~<:' f<.-'. ( A< 
had be~n ~get te instruc~ the jury ~ 
4 ~----..... ~ 
~u..-u..,:~~~..1-A:-41 I 
;-, ~ ~~ •4.N\-' I ~ 
· if vt,.... ,u ... r 
~ ~~ 
a~~~~ , frrt..( 
t--' ~w /. #'~ ~ u~ 
~,./..~.~~ 
as it~ 
He,,""( t I 
Judge Browning ae4€d-His 
view that the decision in Schwinn was 
responsive to and justified by the need 
~-- 1 )/d_ . 
~ e:..-J-w;~ 
to protect "individual traders from 
unnecessary restrictions upon their 
freedom of action." 537 F . 2d, at 
1021. 
We granted Continental's petition 
for certiorari to-reY~~w the appropriate-, 
response under § 1 o restrictions of -
this type. u.s . ( 19 7 ) • 
t'l 
~ ~ ~\~i~Se:o it. is central to the \ 
( " ~ 
-------- r 91- D.-u 
( resolution of th~~Athe Court's 
decision in be discussed 
W-t:. (' ~Uhc..~e, ~4.­
in some detail~ necessita~ng a brief 
16. 
under § 1. ,Schwinn had revised its 
~ War f ~udy~ management ~ concluded 
that the previous "saturation" approach 
was inefficient because of the presence 
~ ,, f 
of ~ ,yml9eq- O'f non-productive 
~ 
retailers. The lution deve-loped by y 
/J 
rJ 
he companyj was to rational-iz and 0"" 
~ 
streamline ~ marketing s~ in a 
new three-tier system comprising, in 
addition to Schwinn itself, 22 inter-
mediate distributors and a network of 
franchised retailers selling to the 
public. The key feature in the new 
system was that only franchised retailers 
would sell Schwinn bicycles to the 
17. 
retailers in any given area by number 
and location, according to its view of 
the needs of the market. In order to 
enforce this aspect of the system, 
both distributors and retailers were 
prohibited from selling Schwinn bicycles 
to non-franchised retailers. In addition, 
the distributors were given the exclusive 
right to supply the franchised retailers 
located within their respective geographical 
areas. 
Schwinn bicycles moved through this 
distribution system in four ways. As 
of 1967 approximately 75% of Schwinn's 
total sales were made under the so- called 
"Schwinn Plan". Acting essentially as 
18. 
forwarded orders from retailers to the 
' 
4/ 
factory.- Schwinn then shipped the 
ordered bicycles directly to the retailer, 
billed the retailer, bore the credit 
risk, and paid the distributor a 
commission on the sale. Under the Schwinn 
Plan, the distributor thus never 
had title or even possession of the 
bicycles. 
The remainder of the bicycles 
moved to the retailer through the hands 
of the distributors. For the most part 
the distributors functioned as 
traditional wholesalers with respect 
to these sales, stocking an inventory 
of bicycles owned by them to supply 
19. 
bicycles that were physically distri-
buted by the distributors were covered 
by consignment and agency arrangements 
that had been developed to deal with 
particular problems of certain distribu-
~ 
tors. 
In the District Court the United 
States charged a continuing conspiracy 
by Schwinn and other alleged co-conspira-
tors to fix prices, allocate exclusive 
territories to distributors, and 
confine Schwinn bicycles to franchised 
retailers--all of which were alleged 
to be per se violations of § 1. 
The District Court rejected the price-
fixing allegation because of a failure 
20. 
held that Syhwinn's limitation of retail 
bicycle sales to franchised retailers 
was permissible under § 1. The 
court, however, found a § 1 violation 
in "a conspiracy to divide certain 
borderline or overlapping counties 
in the territories served by four 
Mid-western cycle distributors." 
237 F.Supp., at 342. The court 
described the violation as a "division 
of territory by agreement between the 
distributors . . • horizontal in 
nature", and held that Schwinn's 
participation did not change its na~ 
The District Court's injunction was 
limited, however, to the territorial 
21. 
Schwinn carne to this Court on 
appeal by the United States from the 
District Court's decision. The Govern-
rnent abandoned its per se theories 
in favor of a rule of reason analysis 
of Schwinn's marketing practices. 
The Government argued that Schwinn's 
prohibition against distributors and 
retailers selling Schwinn bicycles 
to non-franchised dealers was unreasonable 
under § 1 and that the District Court's 
injunction against exclusive distributor 
territories l\hould also) extend to 
Schwinn-Plan, consignment, and agency 
transactions. The Government did not 
challenge the District Court's decision 
22. 
distributor territories where the 
' 
bicycles had been sold. 
As presented in the Government's 
appeal, Schwinn involved "challenged 
vertical restrictions as to territory 
and dealers" imposed by the manufacturer 
on its distributors and retailers. 
388 U.S., at The Court acknowledged 
the Government's abandonment of its per 
se theories of illegality under § 1 
and stated that the resolution of the 
case required it to "look to the 
specifics of the challenged practices 
and their impact upon the marketplace 
in order to make a judgment as to 
whether the restraint is or is not 
23. 
which § 1 df the Sherman Act must be 
read for purposes of this type of 
inquiry." 388 U.S., at 374. Despite 
~ 
this description of its task, the Court 
fl.. 
t· 
proceeded to establish a "bright line" 
per se rule of illegality under § 1 
~ 
the Court for vertical restrictions. 
he l d that "[u]nder the Sherman Act, 
it is unreasonable without more for a 
manufacturer to seek to restrict and 
confine areas or persons with whom 
an article may be traded after t he 
manufacturer has parted with dominion 
v 
over it." 388 U.S., at 379. As the 
opinion in Schwinn makes clear, the 
crucial analytical element in this per 
24. 
to the article" by the manufacturer. 
Ibid. 
Applying the rule to the facts of 
. ~~i 'I Schw1nn the Court reached~ramat: ally 
contrasting results depending upon the 
role played by the distributor in 
the distribution system. With respect 
to that portion of Schwinn's sales for 
which the distributors acted as ordinary 
wholesalers, buying and reselling 
Schwinn bicycles, the Court held that 
the territorial and customer restric-
tions challenged by the Government were 
per se illegal. But, with respect to 
that larger portion of Schwinn's sales 
in which the distributors functioned 
25. 
arrangements, the Court held that the 
same restrictions should be judged under 
the rule of reason. The only retail 
restriction challenged by the Government 
was a "customer" restriction "preventing 
franchised retailers from supplying 
non-franchised retailers, including 
discount stores." 388 U.S., at 377. 
The Court apparently perceived no 
material distinction between the 
restrictions on distributors and 
retailers, for it held that: 
"The principle is, of course, 
equally applicable to sales 
to retailers, and the decree 
should similarly enjoin the 
making of any sales to retailers 
upon any condition, agreement 
or understanding limiting the 
26. 
restrictions that were not imposed in 
conjunction with the sale of bicycles, 
the Court had little difficulty finding 
them all reasonable in light of the 
competitive situation in "the product 
market as a whole." 388 u.s., at 382. 
, Jp ~ 
Continental urges us t~ 
the decision of the Court of Appeals 
) 
4~4-.ef 
~A tA&~QQQ•y that the locations policy 
1\ 
enforced by Sylvania i R ~Ris giQe 
falls within both the letter and 
~ 
the spirit of the per se rule of 
J\ -- --
8Bi!a'BlieA:e8 ±n Schw inn 
illegality/for vertical territorial 
restrictions imposed by a manufacturer 
after parting with title. Sylvania 
~ 
advances~theories in support of the 
27. 
Schwinn, as the Court of Appeals held. 
Second, assuming that Schwinn is not 
distinguishable, Sylvania urges u~ to 
reconsider the correctness of the per se 
-4•*'" .e~ 1 J.;;t 
rule ee~a~li~~ed there. 
~ whether the present case can be 
" 
distinguished from Schwinn. There 
being no dispute that title to the 
television sets passed from Sylvania 
to Continental, the per se rule 
44~~ 
e!!l~~he'd in Schwinn would apply here 
unless the locations policy falls 
outside the prohibition against a 
manufacturer's attempt "to restrict 
territory or persons to whom the product 
28. 
Court of Ap~eals acknowledged, the 
language of the opinion in Schwinn is 
~aaF~ broad enough to cover the 
locations policy as a restriction of 
territory. The issue, therefore, is 
whether the necessary holding in 
Schwinn also encompasses this case. 
Under a functional analysis, a 
reasoned distinction of the present 
case from Schwinn is simply not possible. 
Both Schwinn and Sylvania sought to 
reduce but not to eliminate intrabrand 
competition among their retailers 
through the adoption of a franchise 
system. Although it was not one of 
the issues addressed by the District 
-1.:.~·-:: ~stem includ~d a locations policy 
29. 
similar to the one challenged here. These 
locations policies allowed Schwinn 
~111 'rt : cw 
and Sylvania to regulate the amount 
of intrabrand competition by preventing 
a franchisee from selling franchised 
products from outlets other than the 
one covered by the franchise agreement. 
'llG fiXactl ¥ t:.he sam'i 'iiAQ., ~he Schwinn 
a..La.o 
franchise system ~included a companion 
restraint, S apparently)!ound in 
the Sylvania system, that prohibited 
franchised retailers from selling 
Schwinn products to non-franchised 
retailer~. In intent and competitive 
impact, the retail customer restriction 
tb/lab 5/23/77 
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FOOTNOTES 
!/ With black and white television sets as 
the major product line, RCA had established itself as the 
industry leader with as much as 60 to 70 percent of the 
market in an industry with more than 100 manufacturers. 
~/ In the District Court, Sylvania contended 
that its policy was unilaterally enforced, involving no 
understandings or agreements with the retailers, but the 
jury rejected this contention. 
}/ The agreement imposed no restrictions on 
the right of the retailer to sell the products of 
competing manufacturers. 
FN-2 
under the trade style of "Continental T.V." We adopt the 
convention used by the court below of referring to 
petitioners collectively as "Continental." 
~/ The details of the actions and reactions 
of the parties were relevant primarily to the pendent 
California business torts claim brought by Continental but 
rejected by the jury. See n.9, infra. 
~/ Sylvania's market share in San Francisco 
was approximately 2.5 percnt -- half its national and 
Northern Califoria average. 
21 Sylvania had achieved exceptional results 
in Sacramento, where its market share exceeded 15 percent 
in 1965. 
FN-3 
its inability to obtain television sets to replace the 
Sylvania allocation. 
~/ Continental also asserted a claim for 
breach of contract against Sylvania and Maguire for 
alleged failure to supply or finance certain merchandise 
ordered by Continental in August and September of 1965. 
This claim was ultimately withdrawn. Continental's claims 
against Sylvania and Maguire for willfully and maliciously 
causing injury to Continental's business in violation of 
California law were submitted to the jury but were 
rejected by it. 
10/ See n. 17, infra. 
11/ If a retailer ordered directly from the 
FN-4 
12/ Under the consignment arrangement, 
Schwinn retained titled and the right to immediate 
possession of the goods until the full purchase price, 
less an agreed discount, was paid by the distributor. 
Payment was due when the distributor withdrew the bicycles 
for delivery to a retailer. Under the agency arrangement 
bicycles were stored in the distributor's warehouse in 
space leased by Schwinn. The distributor then invoiced 
the bicycles to a retailer on a Schwinn invoice at the 
out-of-warehouse price established by Schwinn. Under this 
arrangement, Schwinn carried the credit, collected from 
the retailer, and paid a commission to the distributor for 
his services. 
13/ In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 
U.S. 253, 263 (1963), the Court had expressly declined to 
hold vertical territorial and customer restrictions ~ se 
FN-5 
14/ The Court held that the ~ se rule did 
not apply when "the manufacturer retains title, dominion, 
and risk with respect to the product and the position and 
function of the dealer in question are, in fact, 
idistinguishable from those of an agent or salesman of the 
manufacturer." 388 u.s., at 380. 
I~ Sylvania's suggested distinction focuses on a 
comparison of the likely diminution of intrabrand 
competition under the locations policy and under the 
exclusive distributor territories in Schwinn. The 
customer restrictions in Schwinn are ignored on the theory 
that the locations policy embodies no similar provisions. 
We agree with Continental that a locations policy is 
theoretically capable of producing complete insulation 
from intrabrand competition, but we agree with Sylvania 
~ 
that only a manufacturer completely oblivious to ~ own 
interest in effective market development would be likely 




15/ See, e.g., Baker, Vertical Restraints in 
Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to~re?, 44 
Antitrust L.J. 537 (1975); Handler, The Twentieth Annual 
Antitrust Review-- 1967, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1667 (1967); 
McLaren, Territorial and Customer Restrictions, 
Consignments, Suggested Retail Prices and Refusal to Deal, 
37 Antitrust L.J. 137 (1968); Pollock, Alternative 
Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L. Rev. 595 
(1968P; Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: 
An Abaktsus if tge Restructed Dustribution, Horizontal 
Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 Colum. L.J. 
282 (1975); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 
1974, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 191 (1976). But see Louis, 
Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and 
Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing use of a Partial 
Per Se Approach; Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions 
After Sealy and Schwinn, 12 Antitrust Bull. 1181 (1967). 
\ 
FN-7 
illegality of price restrictions has been established 
firmly for a much longer time and involves significantly 
different analytical questions. 
'k~a-~~~ 
~~·.,£·~ 
17/ The distinctions drawn by the lower 
•• a r z 
courts reflect a determination be rea~ Schwinn as narrowly 
as possible. Thus, the statement in Schwinn that 
post-sale vertical restrictions as to customers or 
territories are "unreasonable without more," 388 U.S., at 
379, has been interpreted to allow an exception to the ~ 
se rule where the manufacturer proves "more" by showing 
that the restraints will protect consumers against injury 
and the manufacturer against product liability claims. 
See, e.g., Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 
936-938 (CA 3 en bane), cert. denied, 400 u.s. 831 
(1970). Similarly, the statement that Schwinn's 
FN-8 
~Lt. 
territorial restrictions that would seem to fallAwithin 
the scope of the Schwinn per se rule. See, ~, Carter 
Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1379-1381 
(Ct. Cl. 1971) (~ se rule inapplicable when a purchaser 
~ can avoid the rest~nts by electing to buy the product at 
a higher price); Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, 
Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (CA 10 1973) (apparent territorial 
restriction characterized as primary responsibility 
clause). And courts unable to avoid the ~ se rule have 
urged this Court to reexamine it. See generally, 
Robinson, supra, n. 15, at 270-281. The reactions of the 
a.. ~ j...-.....J.,...L "'"' u , .. .J. • J- o-t- fc t::l.e ,..._.~..._ 
~~r courts which must apply the rules articulated by 
this Court are :::::·;1~81:t:;f:t tJ~= !::::1.... L4--V ' 
18/ One of the most frequently cited 
statements of the rule of reason is that of Justice 
Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 
u.s. 231, 238 {1918): 
FN-9 
To determine that question the court must 
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to 
the business to which the restraint is 
applied; its condition before and after the 
restraint was imposed; the nature of the 
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. 
The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting 
the particular remedy, the purpose or end 
sought to be attained, are all relevant 
facts. This is not because a good intention 
will save an otherwise objectionable regula-
tion or the reverse; but because knowledge 
of the intent may help the court to interpret 
facts and to predict consequences." 
' ~~ Jo 
1~~- r-" / 19/ Per se rules thus require ::;; j ourt to 
~ ~~ ~generalizations 
· -· ~ 
~~ particular commercial 
·~~~ .~.~~ 
~~~ anti-competitive consequences will result f~~ctice 
vr_b. ..- ~ - ~ .r~3~c.~· ::::4~/hg :4· -' ::::~c••·,._ ~ Q r a;,£ tl•a ...... e.<r!:¥' -"~ - ~.....:... .... _ ........ .: -·--- .b;; t..l ... :,eti 
~ ~J1\n;:;Q:;:;;±~ cases that do 
not fit the generalization may arise, but the per se rule 
FN-10 
, and eli~inate the burdens on litigants and the judicial 
system of the more complex rule of reason trials, see 
Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.l, 5 
(1958); United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 
dO 
609-610 (1972), but those advantages &Pe not e~r!iei ent 
se rules. If it were 
otherwise, all of be reduced to per se 
rules, thus introducing . 
~
1 rigidity in the law. 
~ 
20/ In his dissent below, Judge Browning 
argued that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit 
restrictions on the autonomy of independent businessmen 
even though the restrictions have no impact on "price, 
quality, and quantity of goods and services." 537 F.2d, 
at 1019. Competitive economies have social and political 
as well as economic advantages, see, e.g., Northern Pac. 
R. Co. v. United States, supra 356 U.S., at 4, but an 
FN-11 
is of their very esse~ce." Chicago Board of Trade v. 
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Independent 
businessmen enter into a multitude of agreements that 
restrict their freedom of action. Although the social 
science of economics is far from infallible, it provides a 
necessary backdrop for the evaluation of these 
agreements. There is an inherent tension in the franchise 
system between the franchisor's desire to control his 
franchisees in the interest of product quality and 
reputation and the franchisees' desire to control their 
own businesses. Absent some competitive impact, however, 
this tension is not a concern of the antitrust laws. 
We also note that ~ se rules in this area 
may work to the ultimate detriment of the small 
businessmen who operate as franchisees. To the extent 
that a ~ se rule prevents a firm from using the 
franchise system to achieve efficiencies that it perceives 
as important to its successful operation, the rule creates 
an incentive for vertical integration into the 
FN-12 
The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. Law. 669 (1968). 
21/ Interbrand competition is the 
competition between the producers of the same generic 
product -- television sets in this case -- and is the 
primary concern of antitrust law. The extreme example of 
a deficiency of interbrand competition is , of course, 
monopoly, where only one firm produces the product. In 
contrast, intrabrand competition is the competition 
between the distributors -- wholesale or retail -- of the 
product of a particular producer. 
The degree of intrabrand competition is 
1 
~i~¥ independent of the levelf interbrand competition 
confronting the producer. Thus, there may be fierce 
intrabrand competition among the distributors of a product 
produced by a monopolist and no intrabrand competition 
among the distributors of a product produced by a firm in 
a highly competitive industry. But when interbrand 
FN-13 
~/ The Court did not specifically refer to 
intrabrand competition, but this meaning is clear from the 
context and the Court's later reference to interbrand 
competition. 
23/ The Court also broadly hinted that it 
would recognize additional exceptions from the ~ se rule 
for new entrants in an industry and for failing firms, 
both of which were mentioned in White Mo~r as candidates 
""" -
for such exceptions. 388 u.s., at 374. There was no 
holding to this effect because Schwinn ~srl¥ did not 
qualify under either heading. Because the very survival 
of new entrants and failing firms is uncertain, they 
present the strongest argument for the use of vertical 
restrictions: If a company fails as a going concern, 
there will be neither intrabrand nor interbrand 
competition. The Court might have limited the exceptions 
L- LL.- --- -- - ... ,_ L- LL--- ---.&... -----~ -!.L. .... -.L.!--- \.... . ..,j.. 
FN-14 
of their size, financial health, or market share. This 
broader exception demonstrates even more clearly the 
Court's awareness of "redeeming virtues" of vertical 
restrictions. 
1!1 At one point, the Court states that, in 
addition to being anti-competitive, the vertical 
~ 
restrictions subject to the ~ se rule " F4 late the 
I' 
ancient rule against restraints on alienation." 388 U.S., 
at 380. This isolated reference has provoked heated 
criticism from ~ir@~all} all si the commentators ~he 
) 
deeisr&n, most of whom have regarded the Court's apparent 
reliance on the "ancient rule" as both a misreading of 
legal history and a perversion of antitrust analysis. 
See, e.g., Baker, supra n. 15, at ; Handler, supra 
n. 15, at 1684-1686; Robinson, supra n. 15, at 271; but 
see Louis, supra n. 15. This rule of property law 
FN-15 
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1976). The rule 
plays a correspondingly inconsequential part in the 
Court's opinion, which is predominantly oriented toward 
the perceived competitive harms of the restrictions. In 
light of this history, we doubt that the rule against 
restraints on alienation was significant factor in the 
~ 
Court's decision in Schwinn. In any event, we ~ it ~ 
A 
~ 
h-.ano l:ii!!'L1<! e r no relevance to ~eel!rPI antitrust policy. 
" 
25/ Continental's contention that balancing 
intrabrand and interbrand competitive effects is not a 
"proper part of the judicial function," Pet. Br., at 52, 
is refuted by the fact that the Court in Schwinn engaged 
in exactly that process, both when it limited the scope of 
the ~ se rule and when it made the factual determination 
that the restrictions subject to the rule of reason were 
justified. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 
u.s. 596 (1972), is not to the contrary, for it involved a 
FN-16 
26/ Indeed, the same market power would 
result from the same configuration of factors involving a 
vertically integrated company that operated its own retail 
outlets. Section 1, however, has no application to the 
vertically integrated company because of the absence of a 
\ 
"contract, combination, or conspiracy." 
lll See, e.g., McLaren, supra n. 15, at 145; 
Pollock, supra n. 15, at 610. 
~/ See, e.g., Bork, The Rule of Reason and 
the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division II, 
75 Yale J.J. 373 (1966}; Posner, supra n. 15. 
~/ "Generally a manufacturer would prefer 
the lowest retail nrice nossible. oncP it~ nri~o ~n 
FN-17 
30/ See e.g., Preston, Restrictive 
Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public 
Policy Standards, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 506, 511 
(1965). Because of the potential economies involved, even 
businesses that could afford to integrate forward into 
distribution often prefer to use vertical restrictions 
instead. See id., at 512. 
1!1 Bork, supra, n. 28 at Posner, 
supra n. 15, at cf. P. Samuelson, Economics 506-07 
(lOth ed. 1976). 
32/ See, ~' Comanor, Vertical Territorial 
and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 
81 Harv. L. Rev. 1419 (1968); Louis, supra n. 15. 
FN-18 
supra n. , at It is clear that vertical price 
restrictions pose the first danger, see Gellhorn, 
Antitrust Law and Economics, at 256 (1976), but the much 
less precise effects of non-price restrictions appear to 
present less of a danger. We note that whatever 
efficiencies inhere in vertical restrictions would be 
realized regardless of the size and market share of the 
firm using them. The interbrand gains from those 
efficiences would be far less, however, when the 
restrictions were used by one of the dominant firms in an 
already concentrated industry. The danger suggested is 
not presented by this case. Although we do not foreclose 
the possibility that a ~ se rule might be based on 
market power considerations, we need not decide the 
question here. In the meantime, these factors can be 
given adequate consideration under the rule of reason. 
lil See Robinson, supra n. 15, at 279; 
tbjlab 5/26/77 
No. 76-15 
CONTINENTAL T.V., INC. 
v. 
GTE SYLVANIA INC. 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of 
the Court: 
Franchise agreements between manufacturers and 
retailers frequently include provisions barring the 
retailers from selling franchised products from locations 
other than those specified in the agreements. This case 
presents important questions concerning the appropriate 
antitrust analysis of these restrictions under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and our decision in United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
I 
Respondent GTE Sylvania, Inc. ("Sylvania") 
manufacturef s and sells television sets through its Home 
Entertainment Products Division. Prior to 1962, like most 
other television manufacturers, Sylvania sold its 
.r 
television ~ to independent or company-owned 
" 
distributors who in turn resold to a large and diverse 
2. 
intensive reassessment of its marketing strategy, and in 
1962 adopted the franchise plan challenged here. Sylvania 
phased out its wholesale distributors and began to sell 
its television sets directly to a smaller and more select 
group of franchised retailers. An acknowledged purpose of 
the change was to decrease the number of competing 
Sylvania retailers in the hope of attracting the more 
aggressive and competent retailers thought necessary to 
the improvement of the company's market position. To this 
end, Sylvania limited the number of franchises granted for 
any given area and required each franchisee to sell his 
Sylvania products only from the location or locations at 
which he was franchised. ~/ A franchise did not 
constitute an exclusive territory, and Sylvania retained 
sole discretion to increase the number of retailers in an 
of 
area in light of the success or failureAexisting retailers 
in developing their market. The revised marketing 
strategy appears to have been successful during the period 
at issue here, for by ~ Sylvania's share of national 
television sales had increased to approximately 5 percent, 
~ 
3. 
franchisor-franchisee relationship that had previously 
prospered under the revised Sylvania plan. Dissatisfied 
with its sales in the City of San Francisco, 11 Sylvania 
decided in the spring of 1965 to franchise Young Brothers, 
an established San Francisco retailer of television sets, 
as an additional San Francisco retailer. The proposed 
location of the new franchise was approximately a mile 
from a retail outlet operated by petitioner Continental 
T.V., Inc. ("Continental"), one of the most successful 
e 
Sylvania franchises. il Continental protested that the 
A 
location of the new franchise violated Sylvania's 
marketing policy, but Sylvania persisted in its plans. 
Continental then cancelled a large Sylvania order and 
placed a large order with Phillips, one of Sylvania's 
competitors.~During this same period, Continental 
expressed a desire to open a store in Sacramento, 
California, a desire Sylvania attributed at least in part 
to Continental's displeasure over the Young Brothers 
decision. Sylvania believed that the Sacramento market 
was adequately served by the existing Sylvania retailer 
~ 
4. 
~ from its San Jose, CaliforniaWwarehouse to a new retail 
location that it had leased in Sacramen·to. Two weeks 
~ later, allegedly for unrelated reasons, ~ Sylvania's 
credit department reduced Continental's credit line from 
. J£1 
~ $300,000 to $50,000. In response to the reduction in 
credit and the generally deteriorating relations with 
Sylvania, Continental withheld all payments owed to John 
P. Maguire & Co., Inc. ("Maguire"), the finance company 
that handled the credit arrangements between Sylvania and 
its retailers. Shortly thereafter, Sylvania terminated 
Continental's franchises, and Maguire filed this diversity 
action in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California seeking recovery of money 
owed and of secured property held by Continental. 
The antitrust issues before us originated in 
aVtd f'Y\a.. 
crossclaims brought by Continental against Sylvania 
important for our purposes was the claim that Sylvania had 
LM-~ 
violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by entering and enforc~ng 
A 
franchise agreements that prohibited the sale of Sylvania 
t 
products other than from specified locations. l! At the 
5. 
unreasonably restrained or suppressed competition. App., 
at 5-6, 9-15. Relying on this Court's decision in United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co~, 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the 
District Court rejected the proffered instruction in favor 
of the following one: 
"Therefore, if you find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Sylvania entered into a 
contract, combination or conspiracy with 
one or more of its dealers pursuant to 
which Sylvania exercised dominion or control 
over the products sold to the dealer, after 
having parted with title and risk to the 
products, you must find any effort there-
after to restrict outlets or store locations 
from which its dealers resold the merchandise 
which they had purchased from Sylvania to be a 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
regardless of the reasonableness of the 
location restrictions." a~r;· ) a .. J -. 
The jury found that Sylvania had engaged "in a contract, 
6. 
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15 to produce an award of 
$1,774,515. App. at 498, 501. ~/ 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed by a divided vote. 537 
F. 2d 980 (~ 1976) -teo !lanG). The court acknowledged 
that there is language in Schwinn that could be read to 
support the District Court's instruction but concluded 
that Schwinn was distinguishable on several grounds. 
Contrasting the nature of the restrictions, their 
competitive impact, and the market shares of the 
franchisors in the two cases, the court concluded that 
Sylvania's locations restriction had less potential for 
competitive harm than the restrictions invalidated in 
Schwinn and that it should be judged under the "rule of 
reason" rather than the per se rule stated in Schwinn. 
The court found support for its position in the policies 
of the Sherman Act and in the decisions of other federal 
courts involving non-price vertical restrictions. ~/ 
We granted Continental's petition for 
certiorari to resolve · this important question of antitrust 
7. 
Sylvania's restriction on retail locations is a ~ se 
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act as interpreted in 
Schwinn. The restrictions at issue in Schwinn were part 
of a three-tier distribution system comprising, in 
addition to Arnold, Schwinn & Co. ("Schwinn"), 22 
intermediate distributors and a network of franchised 
retailers. Each distributor had a defined geographic area 
in which it had the exclusive right to supply franchised 
retailers. Sales to the public were made only through 
franchised retailers, who were authorized to sell Schwinn 
bicycles only from specified locations. In support of 
this limitation, Schwinn prohibited both distributors and 
retailers from selling Schwinn bicycles to non-franchised 
-....J retailers. kbt--hough a ; .b±c¥~ could· -mov.e .E.rom £c.bw.i:nn -t-o. 
·._J ttni:fa.r.mT¥. : '1.1)"'/ At the retail level, therefore, Schwinn 
was able to control the number of retailers of its 
bicycles in any given area according to its view of the 
needs of that market. 
Acting essentially as a manufacturer's representative or 
--~ tV\ th l'5 piC\~1 
sales agent, a(participati~stributor Aforwarded orders 
from retailers to the factory. Schwinn then shipped the 
ordered bicycles directly to the retailer, billed the 
retailer, bore the credit risk, and paid the distributor a 
commission on the sale. Under the Schwinn Plan, the 
distributor ~ never had title or ~ possession of the 
bicycles. The remainder of the bicycles moved to the 
.s 
retaile~ through the hands of the distributors. For the 
most part the distributors functioned as traditional 
wholesalers with respect to these sales, stocking an 
inventory of bicycles owned by them to supply retailers 
with emergency and "fill-in" requirements. A smaller part 
of the bicycles that were physically distributed by the 
distributors were covered by consignment and agency 
arrangements that had been developed to deal with 
particular problems of certain distributors. o,~~ributor~ 
c..c9u.1r~J hr/e, or\ly t-o those.., b1'cycJes +haJ +.~t/ fu .rcJ..ase.d 
CU:> whole.so.../ev-~ ~ Y"~ ... J-o..,-/e.r.S J of C.ovtrsc..) C<.C.~U l'fC..~ tr rfe... 
to C'--11 o J t h e.. b (t )' c.. I e _s s 6 I q by + IH. h1 . 
In the District Court, the United States 
charaed a continuina rnn~nir~rv hv ~rhwinn ~nn nth 
8. 
territories to distributors, and confine Schwinn bicycles 
to franchised retailers. Relying on United States v~ 
Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944), the Government 
argued that the non-price restrictions were .a:;ts:o ~ se 
illegal as part of a scheme for fixing the retail prices 
of Schwinn bicycles. The District Court rejected the 
price-fixing allegation because of a failure of proof and 
held that Schwinn's limitation of retail bicycle sales to 
franchised retailers was permissible under § 1. The 
court~ however] found a § 1 violationlin "a conspiracy to 
divide certain borderline or overlapping counties in the 
territories served by four Mid-western cycle 
distributors." 237 F.Supp., 323, 342 (N.D. Ill. 1965). 
The court described the violation as a "division of 
territory by agreement between the distributors • 
horizontal in nature," and held that Schwinn's 
participation did not change that basic characteristic. 
Id., at 342. The District Court limited its injunction, 
"' b!!we ver, to apply only to the territorial restrictions on 
/'ll the-,·r ro·les o.~ wholc!.o..I<:.I"S . 
the resale of bicycles. purchased by the distributorsA 
~ 
9. 
Abandoning its ~ se theories, the Government argued that 
Schwinn's prohibition against distributors and retailers 
selling Schwinn bicycles to non-franchised dealers was 
unreasonable under § 1 and that the District Court's 
injunction against exclusive distributor territories 
should extend to all such restrictions regardless of the 
form of the transaction. The Government did not challenge 
the District Court's decision on price-fixing, and Schwinn 
did not challenge the decision on exclusive distributor 
The Court acknowledged the Government's 
abandonment of its ~ se theories and stated that the 
resolution of the case would require an examination of 
"the specifics of the challenged practices and their 
impact upon the marketplace in order to make a judgment as 
to whether the restraint is or is not 'reasonable' in the 
special sense in which § 1 of the Sherman Act must be read 
for purposes of this type of inquiry." 388 u.s., at 374. 
Despite this description of its task, the court proceeded 
to articulate the following "bright line" per se rule of 
10. 
persons with whom an article may be traded after the 
manufacturer has parted with dominion over it." Id. at 
379. But the Court expressly declined to apply this ~ 
se rule when "the manufacturer retains title, dominion, 
and risk with respect to the product and the position and 
function of the dealer in question are, in fact, 
indistinguishable from those of an agent or salesman of 
the manufacturer." Id., at 380. 
Application of these principles to the facts 
of Schwinn produced sharply contrasting results depending 
upon the role played by the distributor in the 
distribution system. With respect to that portion of 
Schwinn's sales for which the distributors acted as 
ordinary wholesalers, buying and reselling Schwinn 
bicycles, the Court held that the territorial and customer 
restrictions challenged by the Government were ~ se 
~ illegal. But, with respect to that larger p~ion of 
Schwinn's sales in which the distributors functioned under 
the Schwinn Plan and under the less common consignment and 
agency arrangements, the Court held that the same 
/ 
1 
J f non-franchised retailers. Id., at 377. The Court 
~-~parentlfl perceived no material distinction between the 
restrictions on distributors and retailers, for it held 
that: 
"The principle is, of course, equally 
applicable to sales to retailers, and 
the decree should similarly enjoin the 
making of any sales to retailers upon 
any condition, agreement or understanding 
limiting the retailer's freedom as to 
where and to whom it will resell the 
products." Id., at 378. 
11. 
Applying the rule of reason to the restrictions that were 
not imposed in conjunction with the sale of bicycles, the 
Court had little difficulty finding them all reasonable in 
light of the competitive situation in "the product market 
as a whole." 
In it ,·!> uvtdt~~u+ed.. 
title to the television . 
sets passed from Sylvania to Continental. Thus, the 
Schwinn~ se rule applies unless Sylvania's restriction 
on locations falls outside Schwinn's prohibition against a 
manufacturer attempting to restrict a "retailer's freedom 
... 1.- ~-
~ a substantial distinction between the 
1~ Sc..hw;Y\Y\ 
restrictions subject d to the~ se uleA~ and the 
one ~~-&~t~·o 4s.fr,(.J-~~} '\ IS 
\ . 
Despite differences in the forms of the 
restrictions, a reasoned distinction of the present case 
from Schwinn is simply not possible under a functional 
1~ 
analysis. Both Schwinn and Sylvania sought to reduce but 
not to eliminate intrabrand competition among their 
retailers through the adoption of a franchise system. 
Although it was not one of the issues addressed by the 
District Court or presented on appeal by the Government, 
~ the Schwinn franchise plan included a location¢ 
restriction policy similar to the one challenged here. 
These restrictions allowed Schwinn and Sylvania to 
a Ill, o ·~ 1 t h.e i r r e.. t a ,· I u.s 
regulate the amount of m:t:t::abraod competition blrj 
- A 
preventing a franchisee from selling franchised products 
from outlets other than the one covered by the franchise 
agreement. To exactly the same end, the Schwinn franchise 
· r~.stric..r''oVI > 
"-.! plan included a companion 1\ r;es.t-r..a:i:n:t., a-apparently l found 
in the Sylvania plan, _ that prohibited franchised retailers 
r 
I 
7'16...1-- T~ ~ ~ ~ '\t 
~~tC44·..._~:..s- t:v/~ 
1-o ~ /2--h~~:cc... ~ ~ I ;--t,_.:::f- 13 
""'-  .L~-4.- A.,~ H:c..cc..-a- . 
ofJ~·c~ 
announced there. In intent and competitive impact, the 
retail customer restriction in Schwinn is 
indistinguishable from the locationf restriction in the 
present case. In both cases the restrictions interfered 
with the freedom of the retailer to dispose of the 
products as he desired. The fact that one 
III 
Under familiar principles of stare decisis, 
is governed by a prior decision 
th~s Court would normally end our inquiry. Illinois 
Illinois, u.s. (1977). 
Nevertheless, we are convinced that reconsideration of 
~
Schwinn is appropriate, as ~~~~ ey SylY-al'lia... -f rom the 
~ 
~ ~ ~ ~·•,......-4C""4•••·;;f-~ 
b89iAAiA9~ Schwinn has been the subject of tMtiH~iilerabie 
"~-~~_.~~~~ I z I .J~>~ .. .A .1-..~- --~~~-I 
........ .~- --..---- ·- • .:..=J r --~, __.,.,...., 
controversy~ Franchise agreements ~@A~ly include a 
;,..._~~ 
~riety of restrictive provision~d iff~ten tXf r o~ s ut 
14. 
~ 
Indeed, one commentator has observed t~ 
~ ~ . 
many courts "have struggled to distinguish or limit Schwinn 
in ways that are a tribute to judicial ingenuity." 13/ 
Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 Colum. 
L. Rev. 243, 272 (1975). And a Court of Appeals has urged 
us to consider the need in this area for greater 
·~ flexibility0 Adolph Coors co. v. F.T.C., 497 F.2d 1178, 
1187 (CA 10 1974). !A etH' JJ..iew r- t he-- j"HHeially craH:ed 
( ru lp •Ut;.o<i J.u S~lwigg i• xi...,. f,.. reeenside«ttien. 
The framework of analysis under § 1 of the 
" Sherman Act is familiar and does not require extended 
discussion. Section 1 prohibits "[e]very contract, 
combination ..• or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce." Since the early years of this century~ 
1-reHevel!', a judicial gloss on this statutory language has 
~QQR ~~~e the "rule of reason" the prevailing standa~d of 
A A · 
analysis. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 
(1911). e£ reaes~he fact finder weighs 
all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a 
restrictive practice should be prohibited as 
15. 
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), "there are certain 
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious 
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are 
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore 
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm 
they have caused or the business excuse for their 
use." 15/ 
The history of the Schwinn per se rule is 
short. In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 
(1963}, the Court refused to endorse a~ se rule for 
non-price vertical restrictions because of uncertainty as 
to whether they satisfied the demanding standards of 
White~~ - Tl-:::t'~)C~ 
Northern Pac. R. Co. ~~ ~ ~h raised the issue) for 
the first time, came to the Court on an appeal by a 
manufacturer of trucks from z summary judgment granted in 
favor of the Government. The District Court had accepted 
the Government's theory that the territorial and customer 
restrictions imposed by the manufacturer were ~ se 




and lack ... ariy redeeming virtue'. II 
Id., at 263, quoting Northern Pac. R. Co. v. 
United States, supra, at 5. 
Only four years after White Motor Co.r3~o"eve~ the Court 
JA 
in Schwinn announced ?\ sweeping~ se rule without any 
subject to the nPr 1se rule are "so obviously destructive 
£::::..::.._ - ; 
' 
of competition that their mere existence is enough ... r 388 
~ ~·t ~~4tC.•d.-~ 4 -p 
U.S., at 379. Nor is~the eco~omic significance of the 
du~ a .IL tAl-i.~~ V/.c,v ~ 
or~ei~ distinctionAbetween sale and non-sale transactions , 
e~~laine~. We turn now to~onsideration of these issues 
in light of the controlling standard of Northern Pac. R. 
"-l Co. 16/ 
The market impact of vertical restrictions is 
complex and controversial because of the potential for a 
simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and 
stimulation of interbrand competition. 17/ Both effects 
~ 
found expression in the Court's decision te eFeaee a 
" 
partial ~ se rHJ- in Schwinn. The ~ se rule for sale 
~
transactions reflected theAview that the restrictions are 
"so obviouslv destructive .. of intrabrand comPetition that 
\ 
17. 
continued adherence to the traditional rule of reason for 
non-sale transactions reflected the view that the 
restrictions promote interbrand comp~~~ io~ ~ A 19/ fin th; t--, 
stated that a more complete ( regard, the Court specifically 
prohibition "might severely hamper smaller enterprises 
resorting to reasonable methods of meeting the competition 
of giants and merchandising through independent 
)) 
dealers. · 20/ 3 88 u.S. , at --J It is impor ~e:P\t te P\ete 
.......... 
~ j[he Court's accommodation of the perceived intrabrand 
harm and interbrand benefit was based exclusively on the 
( 
Z.OJ 
distinction between sale and non-sale transactionsj ~ 
~ ~ d...t..d.. 4..~ -t I, 
e~~~~~~~~~~~~·~men~ the challenged 
1\ 
restrictions on the basis of their individual potential 
for intrabrand harm or interbrand benefit. Thus, the 
restrictions that completely eliminated intrabrand 
S<.hw; \-1 Y\ 
~ competition among distributors were analyzed no 
" 
differently than those that merely moderated intrabrand 





to be ~ se illegal where title had passed, and all were 
evaluated and sustained under the rule of reason where 
7 
18. 
Thus, the lynchpin of the Schwinn ~ se rule 
is the distinction between sale and non-sale 
transactions. Under the standards of Northern Pac. R. 
Co., that distinction must correspond to a substantial 
difference either in intrabrand harm or interbrand benefit 
ill 
caused by vertical restrictions. There is no indication 
that the Court in Schwinn relied on such a relationship, 
Lv<.;~df~ 
and G-lH' stnd;y ];;)iuJ reo ealed no evidence that one exists. 
I 9 )' * 
Vertical restrictions reduce intrabrand 
competition by limiting the number of sellers of a 
particular product competing for the business of a given 
~ group of buyers. Locationp restrictions have this effect 
because of practical constraints on the effective 
marketing area of retail outlets. Although intrabrand 
competition may be reduced, the ability of retailers to 
exploit the resulting market power may be significantly 
limited both by the ability of consumers to travel to 
other franchised locations and, ~e:rha:ps more importantly, 
to purchase the competing products of other 
manufacturers. None of these key variables, however, is 
19. 
competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve 
certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products. 
These "redeeming virtues" of vertical restrictions are 
implicit in every decision sustaining vertical 
restrictions under the rule of reason. Economists have 
identified a number of ways in which manufacturers can use 
~ 
ver~ioa~ restrictions to compete more effectively against 
A 
~ other manufacturers. ~ See, ~' Preston, Restrictive 
Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public 
Policy Standards, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 506, 511 
2Jj 
(1965). Econornist~ als~argued that manufacturers 
have an economic interest in maintaining as much 
intrabrand competition as is consistent with the efficient 
distribution of their products. Bork, supra n. 
B 
at ; Posner, supra, n. , at Although WrtE'" 
~~~~~ 
~ view that the manufacturer's interest necessarily 
corresponds with that of the public is RQ~ ~ni~ersally 
) 
3haFee, even the leading critic of vertical restr•ctions 
s~'s 
concedes that ~•cCo~rt'~ distinction between sale and 
non-sale transactions is essentially unrelated to any 
,. 
20. 
!~ extent that the form of the transaction is related to 
interbrand benefits, the Ge~r& ' ij distinction is 
1-(,...A_ ~~ 
inconsistent with ~ articulated concern for the ability 
i\ 
of smaller firms to compete effectively with larger ones. 
Capital requirements and administrative expenses may 
~~ 
prevent smaller ~s from using the exception for 
non-sale transac See, ~' McLaren, supra n. 
at 145; Pollock, supra n. , at 610. 
~jecting the distinction between sale and 
a~~,u~ 
non-sale transactions we articulated 
basis for the ~ se study of this 
case has suggested no new ~ se rule that would satisfy 
Northern Pac. R. Co. Although the competitive dangers of 
vertical restrictions cannot be discounted, 25/ neither 
can their competitive attractions. In short, we agree 
with the Court in Schwinn that a complete ~ se 
prohibition is unjustified. Nor are we able at this time 
to identify any discrete situations justifying partial ~ 
se rules. Here again, we agree with the implicit judgment 
in Schwinn that a ~ se rule cannot be based profitably 
22. 
restrictions can be ~uate~ policedAunder the rule of 
~~·4-6-4 
reason, which is the standard  to the vast majority 
of restrictive practices challenged under § l. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
tb/lab 5/26/77 
No. 76-15 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc . 
• 
FOOTNOTES 
!/ RCA at that time was the dominant firm 
~ 
with as muchfs as 60 to 70 percent of national television 
sales in an industry with more than 100 manufacturers. 
~/ Sylvania imposed no restrictions on the 
right of the retailer to sell the products of competing 
manufacturers. 
11 Sylvania's market share in San Francisco 
was approximately 2.5 percent -- half its national and 
Northern Califoria average. 
il There are in fact four corporate 
petitioners: Continental T.V., Inc.; A & G Sales; Sylpac, 
Inc.; and S.A.M. Industries, Inc. All are owned in large 
part by the same individual, and all conducted business 
FN-2 
~/ Sylvania had achieved exceptional results 
in Sacramentd, where its market share exceeded 15 percent 
in 1965. 
~/ In its findings of fact made in 
conjunction with Continental's plea for injunctive relief, 
the District Court rejected Sylvania's claim that its 
actions were prompted by independent concerns over 
Continental's credit. The jury's verdict is ambiguous on 
~
this point. In any event, we do not consider it central 
to the issue before us. 
11 In the District Court, Sylvania contended 
that its policy was unilaterally enforced, involving no 
understandings or agreements with the retailers. Sy /vQnl~ 
now o..c.ce~rs the.. ju.ry ·~ ftj ect'ton o~ th1·s toVLf-tAt\h.oV\. 
!!/ 
a~ /::;' • .,a._ 
The jury oeAe l that Maguire had not 
~ 
conspired with Sylvania with respect to this violation. 
FN-3 
restriction was part of a larger scheme to fix prices. A 
' 
pendent claim that Sylvania and Maguire had willfully and 
maliciously caused injury to Continental's business in 
~ 
violation 6f California law was rejected by the jury, and 
~ 
a pendent breach of contract claim was withdrawn by 
Continental during the course of the proceedings. The 
parties eventually stipulated to a judgment for Maguire on 
its claim against Continental. 
~/ There were two major dissenting 
WO.. !. 
opinions. Judge Kilkenny argued that the present caseA~ 
indistinguishable from Schwinn and that the jury had been 
correctly instructed. Agreeing with Judge Kilkenny's 
interpretation of Schwinn, Judge Browning stated that he 
found the interpretation responsive to and justified by 
the need to protect "individual traders fro~ unnecessary 




lr~ _ ~ &+4kA- ~ceiL~ ~~B•~<~"-' \J 
)1,J- ?- ~ .LJcc... to ~ - ~ ~ · SA..£ ~s ~
11/ Sylvania's ,suggested distinction focuses 
on a comparison of the likely diminution of intrabrand 
competition under the location clause and under the 
-
exclusive distributor territories in Schwinn. The 
customer restrictions in Schwinn are ignored on the theory 
that Sylvania's franchise agreement embodies no similar 
.J r /)Co~ ~., ~ ~ .. c..,t...1 ,_ .. /....t. ~ ~ .:~ 
provisions. ~¥e •9*Q.Q J.Jit'R CeReiHelllePl that a locations 
~ 
policy is theoretically capable of producing complete 
insulation from intrabrand competition, but we a~rge ~~th 
4- /1-C c ......e,..-o_.-o M • ,."" P_ ,G_Jc c.~ 
S}'lva!Ti:a that only a manufacturer c~l.ail &il l y oblivious to 
'\ 
~ \'In interest in effective market development would .e& 
l~~ly ~9 use the policy to achieve that result. In any 
~ 
event we consider the comparison drawn in the text to be 
1\ 
the relevant one. As Chief Justice Hughes stated in 
~ Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 
363, 377, "Realities must dominate the judgment .... 
The Anti-Trust Act aims at substance." 
12/ Most scholarly opinion has been critical 
of the decision. See, ~, Baker, Vertical Restraints 
in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to Where?, 44 
Antitrust L.J. 537 (1975); Handler, The Twentieth Annual 
FN-6 
Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L • . Rev. 595 
(1968); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: 
. ' 
An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal 
Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 Colum. L.J. 
282 (1975); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 
1974, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 243 (1976). But see Louis, 
Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and 
Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing Use of a Partial 
Per Se Approach; Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions 
After Sealy and Schwinn, 12 Antitrust Bull. 1181 (1967). 
For a more inclusive list of articles and comments, see 
537 F.2d, at 988 n.l3. 
13/ The distinctions drawn by the lower 
courts reflect a determination to read Schwinn as narrowly 
as possible. Thus, the statement in Schwinn that 
post-sale vertical restrictions as to customers or 
territories are "unreasonable without more," 388 U.S., at 
379, has been interpreted to allow an exception to the ~ 
FN-7 
See, e.g., Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 
I ~ =t-o)( 
936-938 (CA 3 en bane)~ ~. <le.rF!=ea, 4~ A 10 . 
(!9/lll-. Similarly, the statement that Schwinn's 
enforcement of its restrictions had been "firm and 
resolute," 388 u.s., at 372, has been relied upon to 
distinguish cases lacking that element. See, · ~, Janel 
Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 406 
lq la<i 
(CA 2)® ~ den~ 393:::0::5. "9:.38.:.::::{~ Other factual 
1\ 
distinctions have been drawn to justify upholding 
territorial restrictions that would seem to fall within 
the scope of the Schwinn~ se rule. See, e.g., Carter 
Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1379-1381 
(Ct. Cl. 1971) (~ se rule inapplicable when a purchaser 
can avoid the restraints by electing to buy the ptoduct at 
a higher price); Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, 
Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (CA 10 1973) (apparent territorial 
restriction characterized as primary responsibility 
clause). 
FN-8 
u.s. 231, 238 (1918): 
"The true test of legality is whether 
the restraint imposed is such as merely 
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes 
competition or whether it is such as may 
suppress or even destroy competition. 
To determine that question the court must 
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to 
the business to which the restraint is 
applied; its condition before and after the 
restraint was imposed; the nature of the 
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. 
The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting 
the particular remedy, the purpose or end 
sought to be attained, are all relevant 
facts. This is not because a good intention 
will save an otherwise objectionable regula-
tion or the reverse; but because knowledge 
of the intent may help the court to interpret 
facts and to predict consequences." 
15/ Per se rules thus require the Court to 
make broad generalizations about the social utility of 
particular commercial practices. The~~~·t~~~ 
;"\ . 
_,, 3 w .. JJC) 
- ____ .._! _ _ 
FN-9 
reflects the judgment that such cases are not 
sufficiently common or important to justify the time and 
expense necessary to identify them. Once established, ~ 
~ t.c-/C:~J .to 
se rules provide ~lear guidance to the business 
- ~ 
~ communit~nd~~dens on litigants and the 
judicial system of the more complex rule of reason trials, 
see Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.l, 5 
(1958); United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 
~""' f"~-'q4,-.,.4e ""~ 41-.... lk·a~ 
609-610 (1972), but ~kes e avantages are not sufficient 
~ /-t...ll. ....... .t~ ......... 1-o r-~ 
ceRsitiQA&~r the creation of ~ se rules. If it were 
A 
otherwise, all of antitrust would be reduced to ~ se 
rules, thus introducing an unintended o11d tmdes it able 
rigidity in the law/(.::..:::!:.~.4.> u....._~ ~ 
JS-Aj ~/ In his dissent below, Judge Browning 
argued that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit 
restrictions on the autonomy of independent businessmen 
even though the restrictions have no impact on "price, 
quality, and quantity of goods and services." 537 F.2d, 
at 1019. Competitive economies have social and political 
as well as economic advantages, see, e.g., Northern Pac. 
firmly for many years and involves significantly different 
questions of analysis and policy. 





restrict their freedom of action. Although the social 
' 
science of economics is far from infallible, it provides a 
n~cessary backdrop for the evaluation of these ~( 
pgre e ments. There is an inherent tension in the franchise 
system between the franchisor's desire to control his 
franchisees in the interest of product quality and 
reputation and the franchisees' desire to control their 
~
own businesses. Absent ~ competitive impact, however, 
this tension is ·not a concern of the antitrust laws: 
--------
J. 
We also note that ~ se rules in this area 
may work to the ultimate detriment of the small 
businessmen who operate as franchisees. To the extent 
that a ~ se rule prevents a firm from using the 
franchise system to achieve efficiencies that it perceives 
as important to its successful operation, the rule creates 
an incentive for vertical integration into the 
distribution system, thereby eliminating to that extent 
the role of independent businessmen. This danger was 
expressly acknowledged by the Court in Schwinn. 388 U.S., 
at See, ~, Baker, supra n. 15, at 538; Keck, 
fh-L ~hw;nn t~~t,) LJ 7$.u~. lo.w. &~q (tqbq) 
4 
monopoly, where there is only one manufacturer. In 
contrast, intrabrand competition is the competition 
between the distributors -- wholesale or retail -- of the 
product of a particular manufacturer. 
The degree of intrabrand competitio~ 
~ ~ 
independent of the level interbrand competition 
- - " 
confronting the manufacturer. Thus, there may be fierce 
intrabrand competition among the distributors of a product 
/40.... rl-
produced by a monopolist and no intrabrand competition 
A 
among the distributors of a product produced by a firm . in 
a highly competitive industry. But when interbrand 
competition exists, it provides a significant check on the 
exploitation of intrabrand market power because of the 
ability of consumers to substitute a different brand of 
JL..c_~~~ 
the same product.{ /A.../ a.....v ~~. 
18/ The Court did not specifically refer to 
intrabrand competition, but this me aning is clear from the 
FN-11 
context and the Court's later reference to interbrand 
competition. 
would recognize additional exceptions from the ~ se rule 
entrants in an industry and for failing firms, 
both of which were mentioned in White Motor as candidates 
for such exceptions. 388 U.S., at 374. 
-
ualify under either heading. Because the very 
failing firms is uncertain, they 
strongest argument for the use of vertical 
I 
If a company fails as a going concern, 
intrabrand nor interbrand 
~ exceptions 
~ 
t~ tke £22 ~ £Yle to these mostA co~eRt situations)-but, 
ignificantly, it chose to create the far more extensive 
rception for non-sale transactions~. ::,:::::::·.~e 
~ xce~~iono fer PQW 9RtraRt~ aR~ fa1lr t------, this 
lfp/ss 5/28/77 Rider A (FN-11, note 19) Sylvania 
19. The Court also indicated that it would not extend 
its per se rule to new entrants in an industry or to 
failing firms, both of which were mentioned in White Motor 
as meriting special consideration. 388 U.S., at 374. 
If the Court had made its new rule applicable to all 
vertical restrictions except those by new entrants and 
failing firms at least there would have been a rough logic 
to the rule whatever its economic impact. But one can 
perceive neither logic nor economic justification for 
also excluding all nonsale transactions regardless of 
the size, financial health or market share of the 
manufacturers. This distinction does reflect the Schwinn 
Court's uneasiness as to the consequences of introducing 
"the inflexibility which a per se rule might bring if it 
s 
were applied to prohibit all vertical restriction of , 
territory and all franchising .•. " Schwinn, supra, at 
379. But no explanation, in terms of market impac t , was 
offered as to why inflexibility (i.e., a per se rule) was 






~until the full purchase price, less an agreed discou~ 
~ / 
was p~ip by the distributor. Payment was due wh~the 
~ · /, 
distributor withdrew the bicycles for deli :~ ry to a 
retailer. Un~e agency arrangem':::' : icycles were 
/~ 
stored in the 
Schwinn. The 
distributo:~rehouse in space leased by i 




retailer on a Schwinn invoice 
/ 
,,. .. 
"' . ,.. 
pr1ce established by Schwinn. 
/ ' 
at ~, out-of -warehouse 
~ 
Under thi~~~rangement, 
s~fnn carried the credit, collected 
,. 
/ and paid a commission to the distributor for his serv1 
---..._....-~~~--.. ~-·-,._.--~-,..__,.,_----~----------
s. 
20/ Continental's contention that balancing 
intrabrand and interbrand competitive effects is not a 
"proper part of the judicial function," Pet. Br., at 52, 
thus is refuted by Schwinn itself. United States v. Topco 
Associates, ~nc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), is not to the 
contrary, for it involved a horizontal restriction among 
ostensible competitors. 405 U.S., at 608. Cf. Warren, 








M one ~j nt..,. l he ~t states that, in 
"' f 
addition to being anti-competitive, the vertical 
restrictions subject to the per se rule "violate the 
ancient rule against restraints on alienation." 388 u.s., 
at 380. This ioela~ea reference has provoked ~~~J 
criticism from virtually all of the commentators on the 
decision, most of whom have regarded the Court's apparent 
reliance on the "ancient rule" as both a misreading of 
legal history and a perversion of antitrust analysis. 
See, e.g., Baker, supra n. 15, at Handler, supra 
n. 15, at 1684-1686; Robinson, supra n. 15, at 271; but 'Uk.f..J ~~ see Louis, supra n. 15. f hisy ule of property law 
~~,_~~~.v~A.J~ 
apparent 3:-y erlt!: e reril tFio 8 "'l:lui 1'11'1 ease ao a A · i R991'1oe~l!leAt ia.l 
policy of selling to the public only through franchised 
retailers was anti-competitive in intent and effect. 
Brief for the United States, at 26-27, 39, United States 
. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., supra. The rule plays a 
~ ~v· ·J. 
~~ ~ correspondingly inconsequential part in the Court's 
opinion, which is predominantly oriented toward the 
~ 




For example, new manufacturers and ~~ 
v-
manufacturers entering new markets can use the ~~ 
~~~· 
restrictions to offer a somewhat higher return in order to 
induce competent a~a aggreeeivQ retailers to distribute 
-"11 • .,.., .. ., sa>fo:tl'ot. ;te.,.ltt-.. ~ 
their products• ~~~ab~i~"es ~anufacturers ~~use them to 
induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to 
I 
maintenance and repair facilities necessary to the 
effici~t marketing of Because of market 
imperfections 'such as the so-called "free rider" effect, 
th . ~~b 'ddb '1 . esc serv1ces ~1gwt not e prov1 e y reta1 ers 1n a 
A 
purely competitive situation• de~~ite the f~et t"et e~h 
serviee~ than if='Aeil't!=d"i-d. Bork, supra, n. 28 at . , 
Posner, supra n. 15, at 
# 
cf. P. Samuelson, Economics 
506-07 (lOth ed. 1976). 
.a 1 s t s a :iac 4 
Marketing efficiency is not the only 
FN-15 
developments, society increasingly demands that 
manufacturers assume direct responsibility for the safety 
and quality of their products. For example, at the 
federal level, apart from more specialized requirements, 
all manufacturers of consumer products have safety 
responsibilities under the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2051 et ~., and obligations for warranties 
under the Consumer Product Warranties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
/ 
2301 et ~- Similar obligations are imposed by state 
law. See, ~' California Civil Code § 1709 et ~-
23/ Because of the availability of competing 
products, the manufacturer is likely to prefer as 
competitive an intrabrand market as is consistent with the 
·~ 
efficient marketing of ~ product. "Generally a 
manufacturer would prefer the lowest retail price 
possible, once its price to dealers has been set, because 
~ 
a lower retail price means increased sales and higher 




the restrictions interfered 
In both cases 
freedom of the retailer to with the 
h P
urchased products as 
dispose of t e 
he desired. 
restric-The fact that one 
a ddressed to territory and tion was 
-------
1 ee;tal!Y 





o~:R:.ietirx. _ .. product differentiation and, 
Lnerefore, a decrease in interbrand competition. This 
argument assumes that a large part of the promotional 
efforts resulting from vertical restrictions wil f not 
~.I.JJ a,.u ,top. . ~ If. ~ ~ 
convey needed information consumers 
MOt ~ O"'t''er: , ~ not~clear that a~ se rule would result 
s 
a shift to .~ less efficient method A 
4Zf_.~k. ~~~ 
promotional effcrrt&. ~~y creating an 
in anything more than 
of obtaining the same 
exception for restrictions in non-sale transactions, the 
Court in Schwinn effectively rejected this ~ion. 
F-17 
no longer serve as a check on the dist/ inctly 
anti-competitive interests of the retailers. Although 
there may be some problems of proof there is no doubt that 
such an agreement would - be illegal per se. United States 
v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); United 
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.s. 596 (1972). 
263 
__,,__  _,...,. ___ ~- --------- -- ---
In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 ~ 
expressly decl ~--' t:o hold 
/~ _.,. . . 
custom~~ restr1ct1ons ~- se ,.,.. .... .. . . 
illegal under § 1 beca~~e ,., .-
·"" -~ 
of "the economic and business 
~ufficient understanding 
stuff ~o~hich these , ..,. 
/ ;-• 
arrang ements emerge." 
_,.-1,..,-
._.,.."'"'T'",._ _____ __,__.,.._ _ __, __ ... .....____,..,~E'"¥·"·· ......_____.......,.._ ............. ............__~....,. .......... ------
0~-- a...!~ c..v<..- aL~ ~·..oy 
~~~-~~ 
~/9 ·~~ 
to IAJ...~ ..tfu_£LA__ ~ 
.C-<..-t.-.., YI~J .........., ~ 
~_.4-4. ,. ~# ~-~ 
' 
lfp/ss 5/28/77 Rider A~ E· 20 {Sylvania) "v -) l1 ~ - ll 
We conclude that there is no 
distinction drawn in Schwinn between sale and nonsale 
transactions. This view would not necessarily compel us 
z\OSW 
~to conclude that no Eer se rule should apply to vertical 
,__ ~,.d-&~41;~~ ~~1-k.~ 
restrictions. But such an extension ~ would reject the 
I\ . 
view expressed in Schwinn as to the undesirability of 
"prohibit[ing] all vertical restrictions of territory and 
all franchising. II 288 U.S., at 379, 380. Indeed, . . . 
even Continental does not urge us to make all such 
restrictions illegal Eer se. We agree that such an 
expansion of Eer se invalidity would not meet the standards 
prescribed by Northern Pacific Ore ComEany nor be compatible 
sound market In ;;~~ w~~ 
1\ 
unaware that some vertical restrictions can be counter-
~ 
competitive, but we are unwilling to undertake to identify 
~ 
discrete situations that may justify some limited Eer se 
treatment. They can await resolution when presented in 
concrete form. In general, scholarly discussions indicate~ 
that although distinctions can be drawn among the frequently 
used restrictions, they are usually viewed as differences 
2. 
of degree and form rather than substance. See Robinson, 
supra, n. 15, at 279; Averell, Sealy, Schwinn and Sherman 
One: An Analysis and Prognosis, 15 N.Y oL.F. 39, 65 (1969). 
Note to Tyler: I have attempted to reframe this 
paragraph commencing on page 20. It is one of the key 
paragraphs in the opinion. I am not sure that I " have 
it right and suggest that you and Gene put your heads 
together and give me an alternative unless. you think 
my draft is the best we can do. I tentatively reject 
your draft, as it seems a bit indecisive - reflecting 
a proper tendency to maintain a careful balance. But 
when we reach this point in our opinion, I think we 
should be positive, confident and something of an 
advocate. 
lfp/ss 5/30/77 Rider A1 p. 20 (Sylvania) 
A 
We conclude that there is no justification for the 
distinction drawn in Schwinn between sale and nonsale 
transactions. This view would not not necessarily compel 
us to conclude that no per se rule should apply to vertical 
restrictions. It would be argued, at least in theory, that 
such a rule should be expanded to include nonsale trans-
actions. But we have found no such support for such an 
expansion. As noted above, theSSchwinn Court recognized 
the undesirability of "prohibit[ing] all vertical restrictions 
of territory and/or franchsing • • " 288 u.s., at379, 380. 
And even Continental does not urge us to hold that all such 
restrictions are per seLillegal. 
in 
We revert to the standard articulated/NorthetnPac. R. 
f2., and reiterated in White Motor, for determining whether 
vertical restrictions must be "conclusively pre umed to 
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate 
inquiry as to the precise~~that have caused or the 
business excuse for thar use". 356 u.s., at 5. Such 
resttictions in varying forms, are widely used in our 
substantial scholarly and judicial authority supporting 
the social utility and economic soundness of vertical 
restrictions. There is relatively little authority to the 
contrary. Certainly, there has been no showing in this 
case, either generally or with respect to Sylvania's 
agreements - that vertical restrictions have or are likely 
to have a "pernicious effect on competition" or that they 
2. 
"lack ••• any redeeming virtue." Accordingly, we conclude 
28 
that the per se rule stated in Schwinn must be overruled. 
In so holding we do not say that every vertical restrictions 
in impervious to being viewed as a per se violation of § 1 
of the Sherman Act. We do hold the view that if distinctions 
are to be drawn they should be based upon substance in terms 
of the economic effect rather than - as in Schwinn - upon 
formalistic line-drawing. See Robinson, supra, n. 13, at 
p. 79; Averill, Sealy, Schwinn and Sherman One: An Analysis 
and Prognosis, 15 N.Y.L.F. 39, 65 (19691. We therefore 
believe that the appropriate decision is to revert to the 
rule of reason that governed vertical restrictions prior 
to Schwinn. When any competitive effects are shown to 
3. 
adequately policed under the rule of reason, the standard 
traditionally applied for the majority of anticompetitive 
practice challenged under § 1 of the Act. Accordingly, 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
LrP 'Ia' ..:/ 1/ r 
- tb 1 :tab 5rstrt':n 
No. 76-15 
CONTINENTAL T.V., INC. 
v. 
GTE SYLVANIA INC. 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of 
the Court: 
Franchise agreements between manufacturers and 
retailers frequently include provisions barring the 
retailers from selling franchised products from locations 
other than those specified in the agreements. This case 
presents important questions concerning the appropriate 
antitrust analysis of these restrictions under § 1 of the 
fhe. (our+ 1..S 
Sherman Act, 15 u.s.c. § 1, and e~ decision in United 
I ------
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
I 
Respondent GTE Sylvania, Inc. ("Sylvania") 
manufactures and sells television sets through its Home 
Entertainment Products Division. Prior to 1962, like most 
other television manufacturers, Sylvania sold its 
televisions to independent or company-owned distributors 
who in turn resold to a large and diverse group of 
2. 
intensive reassessment of its marketing strategy, and in 
1962 adopted the franchise plan challenged here. Sylvania 
phased out its wholesale distributors and began to sell 
its televisions directly to a smaller and more select 
group of franchised retailers. An acknowledged purpose of 
the change was to decrease the number of competing 
Sylvania retailers in the hope of attracting the more 
aggressive and competent retailers thought necessary to 
the improvement of the company's market position. ~/ To 
this end, Sylvania limited the number of franchises 
granted for any given area and required each franchisee to 
sell his Sylvania products only from the location or 
locations at which he was franchised. 11 A franchise did 
not constitute an exclusive territory, and Sylvania 
retained sole discretion to increase the number of 
retailers in an area in light of the success or failure of 
existing retailers in developing their market. The 
revised marketing strategy appears to have been successful 
during the period at issue here, for by 1965 Sylvania's 
share of national television sales had increased to 
3. 
franchisor-franchisee relationship that had previously 
prospered under the revised Sylvania plan. Dissatisfied 
with its sales in the City of San Francisco, ~/ Sylvania 
decided in the spring of 1965 to franchise Young Brothers, 
an established San Francisco retailer of televisions, as 
an additional San Francisco retailer. The proposed 
location of the new franchise was approximately a mile 
from a retail outlet operated by petitioner Continental 
T.V., Inc. ("Continental"), one of the most successful 
Sylvania franchisees. 21 Continental protested that the 
location of the new franchise violated Sylvania's 
marketing policy, but Sylvania persisted in its plans. 
Continental then cancelled a large Sylvania order and 
placed a large order with Phillips, one of Sylvania's 
competitors. 
During this same period, Continental expressed 
a desire to open a store in Sacramento, California, a 
desire Sylvania attributed at least in part to 
Continental's displeasure over the Young Brothers 
decision. Sylvania believed that the Sacramento market 
4. 
from its San Jose, California, warehouse to a new retail 
location that it had leased in Sacramento. Two weeks 
later, allegedly for unrelated reasons, Sylvania's credit 
department reduced Continental's credit line from $300,000 
to $50,000. 21 In response to the reduction in credit 
and the generally deteriorating relations with Sylvania, 
Continental withheld all payments owed to John P. Maguire 
& Co., Inc. ("Maguire"), the finance company that handled 
the credit arrangements between Sylvania and its 
retailers. Shortly thereafter, Sylvania terminated 
Continental's franchises, and Maguire filed this diversity 
action in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California seeking recovery of money 
owed and of secured merchandise held by Continental. 
The antitrust issues before us originated in 
crossclaims brought by Continental against Sylvania and 
Maguire. Most important for our purposes was the claim 
that Sylvania had violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by 
entering into and enforcing franchise agreements that 
prohibited the sale of Sylvania products other than from 
5. 
restrained or suppressed competition. App., at 5-6, 
9-15. Relying on this Court's decision in United States 
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the 
District Court rejected the proffered instruction in favor 
of the following one: 
"Therefore, if you find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Sylvania entered into a 
contract, combination or conspiracy with 
one or more of its dealers pursuant to 
which Sylvania exercised dominion or control 
over the products sold to the dealer, after 
having parted with title and risk to the 
products, you must find any effort there-
after to restrict outlets or store locations 
from which i ts dealers resold the merchandise 
which they had purchased from Sylvania to be a 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
regardless of the reasonableness of the 
location restrictions." App., at 492. 
In answers to special interrogatories, the jury found that 
Sylvania had engaged "in a contract, combination, or 
conspiracy in restraint of t rade with respect to location 
restrictions alone," and assessed Continental's damages 
at $591,505, which was trebled pursuant to 15 u.s.c. § 15 
6. 
language in Schwinn that could be read to support the 
District Court's instruction but concluded that Schwinn 
was distinguishable on several grounds. Contrasting the 
nature of the restrictions, their competitive impact, and 
the market shares of the franchisors in the two cases, the 
court concluded that Sylvania's location restriction had 
less potential for competitive · harm than the restrictions 
invalidated in Schwinn and thus should be judged under the 
"rule of reason" rather than the ~ se rule stated in 
Schwinn. The court found support for its position in the 
policies of the Sherman Act and in the decisions of other 
federal courts involving non-price vertical 
restrictions. 10/ 
We granted Continental's petition for 
certiorari to resolve this important question of antitrust 
law. u.s. (1976). 11/ 
II 
A 
We turn first to Continental's contention that 
Sylvania's restriction on retail locations is a E££ se 
7. 
addition to Arnold, Schwinn & Co. ("Schwinn"), 22 
intermediate distributors and a network of franchised 
retailers. Each distributor had a defined geographic area 
in which it had the exclusive right to supply franchised 
retailers. Sales to the public were mad~ only through 
franchised retailers, who were authorized to sell Schwinn 
bicycles only from specified locations. In support of 
this limitation, Schwinn prohibited both distributors and 
retailers from selling Schwinn bicycles to non-franchised 
retailers. At the retail level, therefore, Schwinn was 
able to control the number of retailers of its bicycles in 
any given area according to its view of the needs of that 
market. 
f"'"'. 
As of 1967 approximately 75 per cent of 
~ Schwinn's total sales were made under the "Schwinn Plan•:{ 
Acting essentially as a manufacturer's representative or 
sales agent, a distributor participating in this plan 
forwarded orders from retailers to the factory. Schwinn 
then shipped the ordered bicycles directly to the 
retailer, billed the retailer, bore the credit risk, and 
8. 
retailers through the hands of the distributors. For the 
most part the distributors functioned as traditional 
wholesalers with respect to these sales, stocking an 
inventory of bicycles owned by them to supply retailers 
with emergency and "fill-in" requirements. A smaller part 
of the bicycles that were physically distributed by the 
distributors were covered by consignment and agency 
arrangements that had been developed to deal with 
particular problems of certain distributors. Distributors 
acquired title only to those bicycles that they purchased 
as wholesalers; retailers, of course, acquired title to 
all of the bicycles sold by them. 
In the District Court, the United States 
charged a continuing conspiracy by Schwinn and other 
alleged co-conspirators to fix prices, allocate exclusive 
territories to distributors, and confine Schwinn bicycles 
to franchised retailers. Relying on United States v. 
Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944), the Government 
argued that the non-price restrictions were ~ se illegal 
as part of a scheme for fixing the retail prices of 
9. 
franchised retailers was permissible under § 1. The court 
found a § 1 violation, however, in "a conspiracy to divide 
certain borderline or overlapping counties in the 
territories served by four Mid-western cycle 
distributors." 237 F.Supp., 323, 342 (N.D. Ill. 1965). 
The court described the violation as a "division of 
territory by agreement between the distributors .•. 
horizontal in nature," and held that Schwinn's 
participation did not change that basic characteristic. 
Id., at 342. The District Court limited its injunction to 
apply only to the territorial restrictions on the resale 
of bicycles purchased by the distributors in their roles 
as wholesalers. Ibid. 
Schwinn carne to this Court on appeal by the 
United States from the District Court's decision. 
Abandoning its ~ se theories, the Government argued that 
Schwinn's prohibition against distributors and retailers 
selling Schwinn bicycles to non-franchised retailers was 
.unreasonable under § 1 and that the District Court's 
injunction against exclusive distributor territories 
10. 
did not challenge the decision on exclusive distributor 
territories. 
The Court acknowledged the Government's 
abandonment of its per se theories and stated that the 
resolution of the case would require an examination of 
"the specifics of the challenged practices and their 
impact upon the marketplace in order to make a judgment as 
to whether the restraint ' is or is not 'reasonable' in the 
special sense in which § l of the Sherman Act must be read 
for purposes of this type of inquiry." 388 u.s., at 374. 
Despite this description of its task, the Court proceeded 
to articulate the following "bright line" E£.£ se rule of 
illegality for vertical restrictions: "Under the Sherman 
Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to 
seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an 
article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted 
with dominion over it." Id. at 379. But the Court 
expressly stated that the rule of reason governs when "the 
manufacturer retains title, dominion, and risk with 
respect to the product and the position and function of 
11. 
Application of these principles to the facts 
of Schwinn produced sharply contrasting results depending 
upon the role played by the distributor in the 
distribution system. With respect to that portion of 
Schwinn's sales for which the distributors acted as 
ordinary wholesalers, buying and reselling Schwinn 
bicycles, the Court held that the territorial and customer 
restrictions challenged by the Government were ~ se 
illegal. But, with respect to that larger portion of 
Schwinn's sales in which the distributors functioned under 
the Schwinn Plan and under the less common consignment and 
agency arrangements, the Court held that the same 
restrictions should be judged under the rule of reason. 
The only retail restriction challenged by the Government 
prevented franchised retailers from supplying 
non-franchised retailers. Id., at 377. The Court 
apparently perceived no material distinction between the 
restrictions on distributors and retailers, for it held 
that: 
"The principle is, of course, equally 
12. 
where and to whom it wi l l resell the 
products." .!d., at 378. 
7 
Applying the rule of reason to the restrictions that were 
not imposed in conjunction with the sale of bicycles, the 
Court had little difficulty finding them all reasonable in 
light of the competitive situation in "the product market 
as a whole." Id., at 382. 
B 
In the present case, it is undisputed that 
title to the televisions passed from Sylvania to 
Continental. Thus, the Schwinn~ se rule applies unless 
Sylvania's restriction on locations falls outside 
Schwinn's prohibition against a manufacturer attempting to 
restrict a "retailer's freedom as to where and to whom it 
will resell the products." Id., at 378. As the Court of 
Appeals conceded, the language of Schwinn is clearly broad 
enough to apply to the present case. Unlike the Court of 
Appeals, however, we are unable to find a principled basis 
~ for distinguishing Schwinn from the case now before us. 
Both Schwinn and Sylvania sought to reduce 
but not to eliminate competition among their respective 
13. 
the Schwinn franchise plan included a location restriction 
similar to the one challenged here. These restrictions 
allowed Schwinn and Sylvania to regulate the amount of 
competition among their retailers by preventing a 
franchisee from selling franchised products from outlets 
other than the one covered by the franchise agreement. To 
exactly the same end, the Schwinn franchise plan included 
a companion restriction, apparently not found in the 
Sylvania plan, that prohibited franchised retailers from 
selling Schwinn products to non-franchised retailers. In 
Schwinn the Court expressly held that this restriction was 
impermissible under the broad principle 
In intent and competitive impact, the retail customer 
restriction in Schwinn is indistinguishable from the 
location restriction in the present case. In both cases 
the restrictions limited the freedom of the retailer to 
dispose of the purchased products as he desired. The fact 
that one restriction was addressed to territory and the 
other to customers seems irrelevant to functional 
antitrust analysis and, indeed, to the language and broad 
14. 
distinguished, it should be reconsidered. Although 
Schwinn is supported by the principle of stare decisis, 
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, u.s. 
{1977 U/we are convigred that the need for clarification of 
the la~ in this area justifies reconsideration. Schwinn 
~ its~ef was an abrupt and largely unexplained departure 
from White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 
{1963), where only four years earlier the Court had 
refused to endorse a ~ se rule for vertical 
restrictions. Since its announcement, Schwinn has been 
the subject of continuing controversry and confusion, both 
in the scholarly journals and in the federal courts. The 
great weight of scholarly opinion has been critical of the 
decision, 13/ and a number of the federal courts 
confronted with analogous vertical restrictions have 
sought to limit its reach. 14/ In our view, the 
experience of the past ten years should be brought to bear 
on this subject of considerable commercial importance. 
The traditional framework of analysis under I 
~ ~ 1 of the Sherman Act is familiar and does not require 
15. 
century a judicial gloss on this statutory language has 
established the "rule of reason" as the prevailing 
standard of analysis. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 
221 u.s. 1 (1911). Under this rule~the fact finder weighs 
all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a 
restrictive practice should be prohibited as 
anti-competitive. 15/ Per se rules of illegality are 
discrete and carefully defined exceptions to this general 
standard. As the Court explained in Northern Pac. R. Co. 
v. United States, 356 u.s. 1., 5 (1958), "there are certain 
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious 
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are 
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore 
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm 
they have caused or the business excuse for their 
use." (Emphasis added). 15/ 
In essence, the issue before us is whether 
Schwinn's ~£ se rule can be justified under the demanding 
standards of Northern Pac. R. Co. The Court's refusal to 
endorse a ~ se rule in White Motor Co. was based on its 
16. 
"We need to know more than we do about 
the actual impact of these arrangements 
on competition to decide whether they have 
such a 'pernicious effect on competition 
and lack ... any redeeming virtue' .. " 
372 U.S., at 263, quoting Northern Pac. R. Co. 
v. United States, supra, at 5. 
The market impact of vertical restric-
tions 18/ is complex because of their potential for a 
simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and 
stimulation of interbrand competition. 19/ 
Significantly, the Court in Schwinn did not distinguish 
among the challenged restrictions on the basis of their 
individual potential for intrabrand harm or interbrand 
benefit. Restrictions that completely eliminated 
intrabrand competition among Schwinn distributors were 
analyzed no differently than those that merely moderated 
intrabrand competition among retailers. The pivotal 
factor was the passage of title: All restrictions were 
held to be per se illegal where title had passed, and all 
were evaluated and sustained under the rule of reason 
where it had not. The location restriction at issue here 
would be subject to the same pattern of analysis under 
Rider A, p. 16. 
Only four years later the Cou~t in Schwinn announced its 
sweeping per se rule without even a reference to Northern 
Pac. R. Co. and with no explanation of its sudden change in 
position. 17/ We turn now to consider Schwinn in light 
of Northern Pac. R. Co. 
17. 
accommodate the perceived intrabrand harm and interbrand 
benefit of vertical restrictions. The per se rule for 
sale transactions reflected the view that vertica l 
restrictions are "so obviously destructive" of intrabrand 
competition 20/ that their use would "open the door to 
exclusivity of outlets and limitation of territory further 
than prudence permits." 388 U.S., at 379, 380. ~!/ Con-
versely, the continued adherence to the traditional rule 
of reason for non-sale transactions reflected the view 
that the restrictions have too great a potential for the 
promotion of interbrand competition to justify complete 
prohibition. 22/ The Court's opinion provides no 
analytical support for these contrasting positions. Nor 
is there even an assertion in the opinion that the 
competitive impact of vertical restrictions is 
significantly affected by the form of the transaction. 
Non-sale transactions appear to be excluded from the ~ 
~ se ruleifot because of a greater danger of intrabrand harm 
~ or a greater promise of interbrand benefi~)but rather 
because of the Court's unexplained belief that a complete 
Vertical restrictions reduce intrabrand 
competition by limiting the number of sellers of a 
particular product competing for the business of a given 
group of buyers. Location restrictions have this effect 
because of practical constraints on the effective 
marketing area of retail outlets. Although intrabrand 
competition may be reduced, the ability of retailers to 
~ exploit the resulting market power may be & ignificantly 
limited both by the ability of consumers to travel to 
18. 
other franchised locations and, perhaps more importantly, 
to purchase the competing products of other 
manufacturers. None of these key variables, however, is 
affected by the form of the transaction by which a 
manufacturer conveys his products to the retailers. 
Vertical restrictions promote interbrand 
competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve 
certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products. 
These "redeeming virtues" are implicit in every decision 
sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of 
19. 
~~, Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: 
Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 Law & 
Contemp. Prob. 506, 511 (1965). 1ll For example, new 
manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can 
use the restrictions to offer a somewhat higher return in 
order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to 
distribute their products. Established manufacturers can 
use them to induce retailers to engage in promotional 
./.2..£ rt t....<.ll__ 
activities or to provide ~aintenance and repair facilities 
'1 r 
"-~ necessary to the efficient marketing of {\ffi:s:- products . 
/ .$. ,. , c.-/ ~ance and repair are vital s~ for many 
' 1 .s tA.trto~obi/e~ CH -:u-<- ,..~'~u .. , 
products) ~e~more-..e-Kp~±ve- a complexJ-
ones. The availability and quality of such services 
/ affect/ a manufacturer's good will and the competitiveness 
of his product. Because of market imperfections such as 
the so-called "free rider" effect, these services might 
not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive 
situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit 
would be greater if all provided the services than if none 
did. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se_Concept: 
20. 
Economists also have argued that manufacturers 
have ~n economic interest in maintaining as much 
intrabrand competition as is consistent with the efficient 
distribution of their products. M;{ Bork, supra, at 40.3; 
_]}j] 
~ Posner, supra n. 13, at 283, 287-288. Although the view 
that the manufacturer's interest necessarily corresponds 
with that of the public is not universally shared, even 
the leading critic of vertical restrictions concedes that 
Schwinn's distinction between sale and non-sale 
transactions is essentially unrelated to any relevant 
economic impact. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and 
Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 
Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1422 (1968) 25/ Indeed, to the 
extent that the form of the transaction is related to 
interbrand benefits, the Cou·rt's distinction is 
inconsistent with its articulated concern for the ability 
of smaller firms to compete effectively with larger ones. 
Capital requirements and administrative expenses may 
prevent smaller firms from using the exception for 
non-sale transactions. See, ~, McLaren, supra n. 13, 
21. 
transactions. The question remains whether the~ se 
rule stated in Schwinn should be expanded to include 
non-sale transactions or abandoned in favor of a return to 
pev.s.u o $' "t 
We have found no support fo~ 
l 
the rule of reason. 
expanding the rule. As noted above, the Schwinn Court 
recognized ·the undesirability of "prohibit[ing] all 
vertical restrictions of territory and all franchising 
•.. " 388 U.S., at 379, 380. f:..ll And even Continental 
does not urge us to hold that all such restrictions are 
~ se illegal. 
We revert to the standard articulated in 
Northern Pac. R. Co., and reiterated in White Motor, for 
determining whether vertical restrictions must be 
"conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore 
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm 
they have caused or the business excuse for their use". 
356 U.S., at 5. Such restrictions, in varying forms, are 
widely used in our free market economy. As indicated 
above, there is substantial scholarly and judicial 
authority supporting their social utility and economic 
22. 
agreements, that vertical restrictions have or are likely 
to have a "pernicious effect on competition" or that they 
"lack .•. any redeeming virtue." ~~/ Accordingly, we 
conclude that the ~ se rule stated in Schwinn must be 
overruled. lQI In so holding we do not foreclose the 
possibility that particular applications of vertical 
restrictions might justify ~ se prohibition under 
Northern Pac. R. Co. But we do make clear that departure 
from the rule of reason standard must be based upon 
demonstrable economic effect rather than - as in Schwinn -
upon formalistic line-drawing. 
In sum, we conclude that the appropriate 
decision is to return to the rule of reason that governed 
vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn. When competitive 
effects are shown to result from particular vertical 
restrictions they can be adequately policed under the rule 
of reason, the standard traditionally applied for the 
;;-
~ majority of anticompetitive,- practice challenged under § 1 
A ~ 
of the Act. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is 
lfp/ss 5/30/77 Rider A, p. 20 (Sylvania) 
~--~~~~~~~ 
~ 4( It-~~ .to 
!t~~~~~ 
We conclude tha t there is no justification for the 
drawn in Schwinn between sale and nonsale 
~~. 
expaasiQR. As noted above, the Schwinn Court recognized 
the undesirability of " prohibit[ing] all vertical restrictions 
~ 




And even Continental does not urge us to hold that all such 
restrictions are per se illegal. 
in 
We revert to the standard articulated/NorthernPac. R. 
Co., and reitera ted in White Motor, for determining whether 
vertical restrictions must be "conclusively presumed to 
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate 
. . h . i~~h d h LnquLry as to t e prec1se~m e et~ ave cause or t e 
business excuse for thEir use". 356 U.S., at 5. Such 
restr ictions) in varying forms, are widely used in our 
substantial scholarly and judicial authority supporting 
~ 
see social utility and economic soundness. 8£ ve~iea~ 
" 
There is relatively little authority to the 
contrary. Certainly, there has been no showing in this 
case, either generally or with respect to Sylvania's 
agreements )~that vertical restrictions have or are likely 
to have a "pernicious effect on competition" or that they 
~ 
2. 
"lack ••• any redeeming virtue." Accordingly, we conclude 
28'"" f30 
that the per se rule stated in Schwinn must be overruled. 
In so holding we do noi foreclose the possibility that 
particular ~ applications of ~MXXKM vertical restrictions 
might justify per~ prohibition under Northern Pa~  R. 
Co. ,_ But we do make KXX clear that departure from the rule 
of reason standard must ~ 
ar . Lll I w IR!' 
~/\economic effect rather than - as in Schwinn - upon 
~~~~~--~~.ly, 0~--AU~~~~ 
~~/~ 
~~-.~;..~~~~:t-l:s::!i;J;.;:J:::E:::::~l,.-..6;!0~~) • ~e -ehe re :Eere 
 A~~ 
believe that the appropriate decision is to ~~u'irt to the 
A ~ 
rule of reason that governed vertical restrictions prior 
to Schwinn. When ~ competitive effects are shown to 
3. 
adequately policed under the rule of reason, the standard 
traditionally applied for the majority of anticompetitive 
practice challenged under § 1 of the Act. Accordingly, 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
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No. 76-15 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania _Inc .. 
FOOTNOTES 
1:/ RCA at that time was the dominant firm 
with as much as as 60 to 70 percent of national television 
sales in an industry with more than 100 manufacturers. 
~/ The number of retailers selling Sylvania 
products declined significantly as a result of the change, 
but in 1965 there were at least two franchised Sylvania 
retailers in each metropolitan center of more than 100,000 
population. 
11 Sylvania imposed no restrictions on the 
right of the franchisee to sell the products of competing 
manufacturers. 
!/Sylvania's market share in San Francisco 
was approximately 2.5 percent -- half its national and 
FN-2 
21 There are in fact four corporate 
petitioners: Continental T.V., Inc.; A & G Sales; Sylpac, 
Inc.; and S.A.M. Industries, Inc. All are owned in large 
part by the same individual, and all conducted business 
under the trade style of "Continental T.V." We adopt the 
convention used by the court below of referring to 
petitioners collectively as "Continental." 
~/ Sylvania had achieved exceptional results 
in Sacramento, where its market share exceeded 15 percent 
in 1965. 
21 In its findings of fact made in 
conjunction with Continental's plea for injunctive relief, 
the District Court rejected Sylvania's claim that its 
actions were prompted by independent concerns over 
Continental's credit. The jury's verdict is ambiguous on 
this point. In any event, we do not consider it relevant 
to the issue before us. 
FN-3 
it now concedes that its location restriction involved 
understandings or agreements with the retailers. 
~/ The jury also found that Maguire had not 
conspired with Sylvania with respect to this violation. 
Other claims made by Continental were either rejected by 
the jury or withdrawn by Continental. Most important was 
the jury's rejection of the allegation that the location 
restriction was part of a larger scheme to fix prices. A 
pendent claim that Sylvania and Maguire had willfully and 
maliciously caused injury to Continental's business in 
violation of California law also was rejected by the jury, 
and a pendent breach of contract claim was withdrawn by 
Continental during the course of the proceedings. The 
parties eventually stipulated to a judgment for Maguire on 
its claim against Continental. 
10/ There were two major dissenting 
opinions. Judge Kilkenny argued that the present case is 
FN-4 
found the interpretation responsive to and justified by 
the need to protect "individual traders from unnecessary 
restrictions upon their freedom of action." 537 F.2d, at 
1021. 
11/ This Court has never given plenary 
consideration to the question of the proper antitrust 
analysis of location restrictions. Before Schwinn such 
restrictions had been sustained in Boro Hall Corp. v. 
General Motors C~, 112 F.2d 822 (CA 2 1942). Since the 
decision in Schwinn, location restrictions have been 
sustained by three Courts of Appeals, including the 
decision below. Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 
F.2d 567 (CA 10 1975); Kaiser v. General Motors Corp., 396 
F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 530 
F.2d 964 (CA 3 1976). 
12/ Sylvania's suggested distinction focuses 
A customer restrictions in Schwinn on the theory that 
Sylvania's franchise agreement embodieJ no similar 
FN-5 
provisions. Continental's response is that a location 
restriction also is capable theoretically of producing 
complete insulation from intrabrand competition. Despite 
this possibility, it seems more likely that only a 
manufacturer oblivious to its own interest in effective 
market development would use the policy to achieve that 
result. In any event, we consider the comparison drawn in 
the text to be the relevant one. As Chief Justice Hughes 
stated in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 
U.S. 344, 363, 377, "Realities must dominate the judgment 
.... The Anti-Trust Act aims at substance." 
13/ A former Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust has described Schwinn as "an exercise in barren 
formalism" that is "artificial and unresponsive to the 
competitive needs of the real world." Baker, Vertical 
Restraints in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to 
FN-6 
Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Retail Prices and 
Refusal to Deal, 37 Antitrust L.J. 137 (1968); Pollock, 
Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. 
U.L. Rev. 595 (1968); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the 
Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted 
Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition 
Decisions, 75 Colum. L.J. 282 (1975); Robinson, Recent 
Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 243 
(1976); Note, Vertical Territorial and Customer 
Restrictions in the Franchising Industry, 10 Colum. J.L. & 
Soc. Prob. 497 (1974); Note, Territorial and Customer 
Restrictions: A Trend Toward a Broader Rule of Reason?, 40 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 123 (1971); Note, Territorial 
Restrictions and Per Se Rules -- A Reevaluation of the 
Sch~inn and Sealy Doctrines, 70 Mich. L. Rev. (1972). But 
see Louis, Vertical Distributional Restraints Under 
Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing use 
of a Partial Per Se Approach; Zimmerman, Distribution 
Restrictions After ~ealy and Schwinn, 12 Antitrust Bull. 
1181 (1967). For a more inclusive list of articles and 
FN-7 
14/ Indeed, as one commentator has observed, 
many courts "have struggled to distinguish or limit 
Schwinn in ways that are a tribute to judicial ingenuity." 
Robinson, supra n. 13, at 272. Thus, the statement in 
Schwinn that post-sale vertical restrictions as to 
customers or territories are "unreasonable without more," 
388 U.S., at 379, has been interpreted to allow an 
exception to the ~ se rule where the manufacturer proves 
"more" by showing that the restraints will protect 
consumers against injury and the manufacturer against 
product liability claims. See, ~~, Tripoli Co. v. Wella 
Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 936-938 (CA 3 1970) (en bane). 
Similarly, the statement that Schwinn's enforcement of its 
restrictions had been "firm and resolute," 388 U.S., at 
372, has been relied upon to distinguish cases lacking 
that element. See, ~' Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin 
Parfums Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 406 (CA 2 1968). Other 
factual distinctions have been drawn to justify upholding 
territorial restrictions that would seem to fall within 
the scope of the Schwinn ~ se rule. See, ~' Carter 
FN-8 
a higher price); Colorado Pump & Su£E!y Co. v. Febco, 
Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (CA 10 1973) (apparent territorial 
restriction characterized as primary responsibility 
clause). One Court of Appeals has expressly urged us to 
consider the need in this area for greater flexibility. 
Adolph Coors Co. v. F.T.C., 497 F.2d 1178, 1187 (CA 10 
1974). The decision Schwinn and the developments in the 
lower courts have been exhaustively surveyed in ABA 
Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 2, Vertical Restrictions 
tl v: h 
Limiting Intrabrand Competition (1977) [ ABA Y ,onoJ ro.~ 
'J N ·•J 0. 'J. • 
15/ One of the most frequently cited 
statements of the rule of reason is that of Justice 
Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 
u.s. 231, 238 (1918): 
"The true test of legality is whether 
the restraint imposed is such as merely 
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes 
competition or whether it is such as may 
suppress or even destroy competition. 
To determine that question the court must 
FN-9 
restraint and iti effect, actual or probable. 
The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting 
the particular remedy, the purpose or end 
sought to be attained, are all relevant 
facts. This is not because a good intention 
will save an otherwise objectionable regula-
tion or the reverse; but because knowledge 
of the intent may help the court to interpret 
facts and to predict consequences." 
16/ Per se rules thus require the Court to 
make broad generalizations about the social utility of 
particular commercial practices. The probability that 
anti-competitive consequences will result from a practice 
and the severity of those consequences must be balanced 
against its pro-competitive consequences. Cases that do 
not fit the generalization may arise, but a ~ se rule 
reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently 
common or important to justify the time and expense 
necessary to identify them. Once established, ~ se 
rules tend to provide guidance to the business community 
and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial 
FN-10 
609-610 (1972), but those advantages are not sufficient in 
themselves to justify the creation of Eer se rules. If it 
law 
were otherwise, all of antitrust would be reduced to ~ 
1\ 
~~ rules, thus introducing an unintended and undesirable 
rigidity in the law. 
17/ After White Motor Co., the Courts of 
Appeals continued to evaluate territorial restrictions 
according to the rule of reason. Sandura Co. v. ~~~~, 
339 F.2d 847 (CA 6 1964); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. F.T.C., 
321 F.2d 825 (CA 7 1963~ 
~\ For an exposition of the history of the 
antitrust analysis of vertical restrictions before 
Schwinn, see ABA Monograph No. 2, supra n. 14, at 6-7. 
18/ As in Schwinn, we are concerned here 
only with non-price vertical restrictions. The ~ se 
illegality of price restrictions has been established 
FN-11 
19/ Interbrand competition is the 
competition between the manufacturers of the same generic 
product -- television sets in this case -- and is the 
primary concern of antitrust law. The extreme example of 
a deficiency of interbrand competition is monopoly, where 
there is only one manufacturer. In contrast, intrabrand 
competition is the competition between the distributors --
wholesale or retail -- of the product of a particular 
manufacturer. 
The degree of intrabrand competition is 
wholly independent of the level of interbrand competition 
confronting the manufacturer. Thus, there may be fierce 
intrabrand competition among the distributors of a product 
produced by a monopolist and no intrabrand competition 
among the distributors of a product produced by a firm in 
a highly competitive industry. But when interbrand 
competition exists, as it does among television 
manufacturers, it provides a significant check on the 
exploitation of intrabrand market power because of the 
ability of consumers to substitute a different brand of 
I 
FN-12 
20/ The Court did not specifically refer to 
intrabrand competition, but this meaning is clear from the 
eciltJs iE'I r 
""' context. a-nd- the Cotu~' rate~A .r;e:fe:.t:e:J+Ge - t:-e- trlt-efir-a-mJ 
CQIDpeH ti on 
~!/ The Court also stated that to impose 
vertical restrictions in sale transactions would "violate 
the ancient ,rule against restraints on alienation." 388 
U.S., at 380. This isolated reference has provoked sharp 
criticism from virtually all of the commentators on the 
decision, most of whom have regarded the Court's apparent 
reliance on the "ancient rule" as both a misreading of 
legal history and a perversion of antitrust analysis. 
See, ~.!.~ ~· _./ __ , Handler, .§_Upra 
foSY\ii> ~}Afr~ Y\, l:.S) ttt ~q-S-1£1!4 
n • 13 , at 16 8 4 -16 8 6 ; A Rob i n son , supra n . 1.3 , at 2 71 ; but 
"-
1 TN.?~ 
see Louis, .§_Upra n. 13 A We quite agree with MR. JUSTICE 
STEWART's dissenting comment in Schwinn that "the state of 
the common law 400 or even 100 years ago is irrelevant to 
~ the issue before us: the effect of the antitrust laws 
FN-)1.-A 
We are similarly unable to accept Judge Browning's 
argument in his dissent below that the Sherman Act was intended 
to pr-oh~ 1' • -
A~estr1ct1ons on the autonomy of independent businessmen 
even though the restrictions have no impact on "price, 
quality, and quantity of goods ~nd services." 537 F.2d, 
at 1019. Competitive economies have social and political 
as well as economic a.dvantages, see, e.g., Northern Pac. 
."'v R. Co. v. United States~ 356 U.S., at 4, but an 
antitrust policy divorced from ,;arket considerations would 
lack any objective benchmarks. As Justice Brandeis 
• remind~d us, "Every agreement concerning trade, every 
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain 
,9-------
is of their very essence." Chicago Board of Trade v. 
4-t ~· 
United States, 246 u .s . .J ~.,. 2380~·.-
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FN-14 
control over the manner in which his products are sold and 
serviced. As a result of statutory and common law 
developments, society increasingly demands that 
manufacturers assume direct responsibility for the safety 
and quality of their products. For example, at the 
federal level, apart from more specialized requirements, 
all manufacturers of consumer products have safety 
responsibilities under the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 
u.s.c. § 2051 et ~~.,and obligations for warranties 
under the Consumer Product Warranties Act, 15 u.s.c. § 
2301 et ~~· Similar obligations are imposed by state 
law. See, e.g., California Civil Code§ 1709 et ~· , 
The.__ ]e._jl,f!VV\~C~ Cf j~h_e )e_ C.OhctYVI ~ hAS h(;UI• rec oQhiL.ei 
IH I'AU:_. 'f'tvoiJth" vexftcetl r~< .. ·ncf-JO'r.f:.. Sef-lC'if> 
f ~; (<;;.· V· \fYiJ!!' Lo rJ_ ) ~[~ h l 1'-/, 
-'WR\-f)e-t · tive an i-ntr:.abrand market as is co siste-nt'Yrt~ 
~f.i-cient mark.e~ting of i ts--p"tu~. "Generally a 
manufacturer would prefer the lowest retail price 
possible, once its price to dealers has been set, because 
a lower retail price means increased sales and higher 
FN-15 
is likely to view the difference between the price at 
I 
which it sells to its retailers and its price to the 
consumer as his cost of distribution, which it would 
prefer to minimize. Posner n. 13, at 2it3". 
25/ Professor Comanor argues that the 
promotional activities encouraged by vertical restrictions 
result in product differentiation and, therefore, a 
decrease in interbrand competition. This argument is 
flawed by its necessary assumption that a large part of 
the promotional efforts resulting from vertical 
restrictions will not convey socially desirable 
information about product availability, price, quality and 
services. Nor is it clear that a~ se rule would result 
in anything more than a shift to less efficient method of 
obtaining the same promotional effects. 
26/ We also note that Eer se rules in this 
area may work to the ultimate deteriment of the small 
FN-16 
important to its successful operation, the r ule creates an 
incentive for vertical integration into the distribution 
system, thereby eliminating to that extent the role of 
independent businessmen. See, ~~, Bak.er, supra n. 13, 
at 538: Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. Law. 669 (1969). 
~21 Continental's contention that balancing 
intrabrand and interbrand competitive effects of vertical 
restrictions is not a "proper part of the judicial 
function," Pet. Br., at 52, is refuted by Schwinn itself. 
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 u.s. 596 
(1972), is not to the contrary, for it involved a 
horizontal restriction among ostensible competitors. 405 
u.s., at 608. Cf. Warren, Economics of Closed-Territory 
Distribution, 2 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. (No. 2), 111, 
115 (1968). 
28/ There mav be occasional oroblems in 
FN-17 
latter category would be illegal ~ se, see, ~' United 
States v. General Motors Corp., 384 u.s. 127 (1966): 
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 
(1972), and we do not regard the problems of proof as 
sufficiently great as to justify a ~ se rule. 
29/ The location restriction used by 
Sylvania was neither the least nor the most restrictive 
provision that it could have used. See ABA Monograph 
No. 2, supra n. 14, at 20-25. But we agree that the 
implicit judgment in Schwinn that a ~ se rule based on 
the nature of the restriction is, in general, 
undesirable. Although distinctions can be drawn among the 
frequently used restrictions, we are inclined to view them 
as differences of degree and form. See Robinson, supra n. 
13, at 279: Averill, Sealy, Schwinn and Sherman One: An 
Analysis and Prognosis, 15 N.Y.L.F. 39, 65 (1969). We are 
unable to perceive significant social gain from 
channellina transactions into one form or another. 
FN-18 
\< Sylvania was faltering, if not failing, and we think it 
would be unduly artificial to deny it the use of valuable 
competitive tools. 
30/ The importance of stare decisis is0of ._,/ 
course, unquestioned, but as Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
stated in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940): 
"stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a 
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, 
however recent and questionable, when such adherence 
involves collision with a prior doctrine more embrancing 




CONTINENTAL T~V., INC. 
v. 
GTE SYLVANIA INC. 
the Court: 
At issue in this case is the appropriate 
standard of analysis under § 1 of the She rma n Act, 15 
u.s~c. § 1, of a marketing program adopted by Re sponde nt 
Sylvania in 196~ in. an effort to improve the sales o f the 
television sets produced by its Home Enterta inme nt 
Products Division. As an integral part of that p r ogram , 
Syl~ania and its retailers entered into agreements 
prohibiting retailers from selling Sylvania products fr om 
locations tither than those specified in the ag r eements. 
Continental's challenge to thos e restrictions presents 
important questions concerning our decision in United 




to a large and diverse group of retailers. Prompted by a 
decline in its market share to a relatively insignificant 
one to two percent of national television sales, !/ 
Sylvania conducted an intensive reasses~ment of its 
marketing strategy in 1962 and, as a result, adopted the 
"elbow room" poliqy challenged here. Under this revised 
marketing system, Sylvania phased out its wholesale 
distributors and substituted a "straight-line" 
distribution system through which television sets were 
sold directly to a smaller and more select group of 
franchised retailers. An acknowledged purpose of the 
change was to decrease the number of retailers selling 
' Sylvania television sets in the hope of attr•cting the 
more aggressive and competent retailers thought necessary 
/ > to the improv·ement of the compan:J: market position. To 
·this end, Sylvania limited the nu~ber of franchises 
granted for any given area and required each franchisee to 
·~ 
.; agree !:_/ to sell ~ Sylvania products 11 only from the 
~ 
location or locations at which ~ was franchised. A 
franchise did not constitute an exclusive territorv. and 
3. 
number of retailers in an area in light of the success or 
failure of existing retailers in penetrating a market. 
~i ffiewlbc; 
successful during the period at issue here. By 1965, 
s-&;11~~ '~ av I'M.~ 
_ 1 · SyJ:\1~ share had increased to approximately five 
A t!tt ",4 
percent, a rl'e SyluanJ.a b.ag....beesl\e=-a ~~ifig.aFtt faeter 
" -o= ~inettstry , raking as the nation's eighth largest 
manufacturer and seller of color television sets. 
v 
This suit is the result of the r~puture of a 
previously successful franchisor-franchisee relationship 
between Sylvania and Petitioner Continental T.V., Inc. !/ 
The "elbow room" policy had been in effect for some time 
when in May of 1964 Sylvania persuaded Continental, an 
established retailer of television sets in northern 
California, to become a franchised Sylvania retailer. 
Initially the relationship prospered. By May of 1965, 
.tt(b. I .s 
Continental waS one of ~ ~arges~ Sylvani~retailers) ~i~R~p~~ 
. ~~ 
o~he COWl t t-¥ 1 operating ..SylviW ia franchises at eight 
locations in a number of northern California counties. 
·, 
·,,: . ........ 
4. 
surprisingly, the parties present sharply contrasting 
versions of the events leading up to the termination. For 
purposes of our discussion of the Sherman Act issue before 
us, ~/ only a brief summary is necessary. 
Dissatisfied with its sales in the City of 
San Francisco-, ~/ Sylvania decided in the spring of 1965 
to franchise Young Brothers, an established San Francisco 
retailer of television sets, as an additional San 
Francisco retailer. Because the proposed location of the 
•' . . . ~ 
new franchise was approximately a mile from one of 
Continental's franchised locations, Continental protested 
to Sylvania that the new franchise violated the "elbow 
room" policy. When Sylvania persisted in its plans, 
Continental cancelled a ~ylvania order and placed a 
large order with Phillips, one of Sylvania's competitors. 
During this same period, Continental expressed a desire to 
open a store in Sacramento, Califoria, a desire Sylvania 
attributes at least in part to Continental's displeasure 
over the Young Brothers decision~ania believed that 
5. 
Continental advised Sylvania in early September of 1965 
that it was in the process of moving Sylvania merchandise 
from . its san Jose, california warehouse to a new retail 
location that it had leased in Sacramento . . Two weeks 
later, Sylvania's cr~dit department reduced Continental's 
credit line from $300,000 to $50,000. Despite Sylvania's 
assertion that the credit decision was simply the 
culmination of a continuing review of Continental's credit 
situation, Continental attributed the decision to 
I 
Sylvania's effort to kee~ it out of the Sacramento 
market. In response to the reduction in credit and the 
generally deteriorating relations with Sylvania, 
Continetnal witheld all payments owing to Maguire, the 
company that handled the credit arrangements between 
Sylvania and its retailers. After payments had been 
withheld for three weeks and at least $62,000 was due, 
Maguire repossessed the Sylvania merchandise in 
action to collect the 
amounts due, including indebtedness accelerated because of 
the payment default. On October 12, 1965, the same date 
that this action was filed, Sylvania notified Continental 
countercl~ims and crossclaims brought by Continental 
against Maguire and Sylvania. 2/ Alleging that 
Sylvania's franchise agreement included an unwritten 7 
provision that prohibited franchisees from Sylvania 
products from any locations other than the ones at which 
they were franchised. Continental argued that the making 
~nd enforcement of these agreements constituted a ~ se 
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, as interpreted in 
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn Co., supra. 
The case was tried to a jury which returned 
its verdict in the form of answers to special 
interrogatories. Although the jury rejected Continental's 
cl,im that its locations policy had be~n coupled with 
unlawful price fixing, it held that Sylvania had engaged 
"in a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of 
trade with respect to location restrictions alone." The 
jury assessed Continental's damages from this violation at 
$591,505, which was trebled pursuant to 15 u.s~c~ § 15 to 
produce an award of $1,775,515. 537 F.2d, at 986. The 
1. I 
On appeal to· the tourt of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, Sylvania argued that the District Court had 
~nstructed the jury incorrectly under § 1. Relying on the 
decision in Schwinn, the District Court had rejected an 
instruction phrased in terms of the reasonableness of the 
challenged restrictions, and instructed instead as follows: 
"~herefore, if you find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Sylvania entered into a 
contract, combination or conspiracy with 
one or more of its dealers pursuant to 
which Sylvania exercised dominion or control 
over the products sold to the dealer, after 
having parted with title and risk to the 
products, you must find any effort there-
after to restrict outlets or store locations 
from which its dealers resold the merchandise 
which they had purchased from Sylvania to be a 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
regardless of the reasonableness of the 
location restrictions." 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals 
affirmed in an unpublished opinion that was subsequently 
withdrawn when en bane consideration was granted. The 
Court of Appeals sitting en bane r.eversed the District 
Court, also by a divided vote, distinguishing the present 
I 
8. 
locations policy under S 1. ,Acknowledging that there is 
language in the Schwinn opinion that could be read to 
support the instruction given by the District Court, the 
court concluded that the present case could and should be 
distinguished from Schwinn: 
"Thus a critical and very obvious 
distinction between the restrictions 
in Schwinn and those of Sylvania is that 
Schwinn involved a restricti9n on the 
locations and types of permissible 
vendees, while Sylvania only imposed 
restrictions on the permissible locations 
• 
of vendors • . . . {I] t is clear to· us 
that 'territory' and 'areas' refer to the 
location of vendees, rather than vendors." 
537 F.2d, at 990. 
-
Focusing on exclusive distributor territories at issue in 
Schwinn, the court noted that intrabrand competition th 1 e 
was "wholly destroyed." 537 F.2d, at 990. The court 
found the locations policy of Sylvania to be in "marked 
contrast," because 
1 
"Sylvania franchised at least two dealers 
in the major markets and each Sylvania dealer 
was free to ·sell to any buyer he chose 
preserving intrabrand competition and allowing 
to every potential purchaser of Sylvania 
9. 
~ 
The court embraced ~e distinction because of its 
view that a ~ se rule of illegality for a locations 
policy would be inconsistent with the policies underlying 
the Sherman Act and with numerous federal court decisions 
sustaining the same or similar restrictions. 
There were two major dissenting opinions. 
Judge Kilkenny ar,gued that the present case is 
indistinguishable from Schwinn and that the jury had been 
correctly instructed. Agreeing with Judge Kilkenny's 
interpretation of Schwinn, Judge Browning stated that he 
found the interpretation responsive to and justified by 
the need to protect "individual traders from unnecessary 
restrictions upon their freedom of action." 537 F.2d, at ~ 
1021. 
We granted Continental's petition for 
I 
certiorari because of the confusion in the federal courts 
as to the correct application of the decisio;l in Schwinn 




spirit of Schwinn ~ ~ rule for vertical territorial 
restrictions imposed by a manufacturer after parting with 
title. Sylvania advances two theories in support of the 
result below. First, Sylvania argues that this case is 
distinguishable from Schwinn, as the Court of Appeals 
held. Second, assuming that Schwinn is not 
~ 
distinguishable, Sylvania urges +t to reconsider the 
correctness of the ~ se rule enunciated there. 
A 
As the court's decision in Schwinn is central 
to the resolution of this case~ it will be discussed in 
some detail. We commence with a summary of the marketing 
program adopte~ by Schwinn and attacked by the Government 
under § 1. Schwi~n had revised its 111atlte4!:in~rogram 
after its management had concluded that the previous 
~saturation" approach was inefficient because of the 
presence of too many non-productive retailers. The 
company's solution was to streamline its marketing efforts 
in a new three-tier system comprising, in addition to 
Schwinn itself, 22 intermediate distributors and ~ network 
11. 
retailers would sell Schwinn bicycles to the public. 
Schwinn limited the franchised retailers in any given area 
by number and location, according to its view of the needs 
of the market. In order to enforce this aspect of the 
system, both distributors and retailers were prohibited 
from selling Schwinn bicycles to non-franchised 
retailers. In addition, the distributors were given the 
exclusive right to supply the franchised retailers located 
within their respective geographical areas. 
Schwinn bicycles moved through this 
distribution system in four ways. As of 1967 
approximately 75% of Schwinn's total sales were made under 
the "Schwinn Plan". Acting essentially as a 
manufacturer's representative or sales agent, a 
participating distributor forwarded orders from retailers 
-L. 
to the factory. 11/ Schwinn ten shipped the ordered 
I\ 
bicycles directly to the retailer, billed the retailer, 
bf ore the credit risk, and paid the distributor a 
commission on the sale • Under the 9ehlJ~lan, the 
. distributor thus never had title or even possession of the 
bicycles. · 
12. 
retailer th~ough the hands of the distributors. For the 
most part the distributors functioned as traditiona i_ 
wholesalers with respect to these sales, stocking an 
inventory of bicycles owned by them to supply retailers 
with emergency and "fill-in" requirements. A smaller part 
of the bicycles that were physically distributed by the 
distributors were covered by consignment and agency 
arrangements that had been developed to deal with 
particular problems of certain distributors. 12/ 
In the District Court the United States 
charged a continuing conspiracy by Schwinn and other 
alleged co-conspirators to fix prices, allocate exclusive 
territories to distributors, and confine Schwinn bicycles 
to franchised retailers. Relying on United States v. 
Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944), the Government 
argued that the nor,-pr ice restrictions were also E£!. se 
illegal as part of a scheme for fixing the retail prices 
of Schwinn bicycles. T~e District Court rejected the 
price-fixing allegation because of a failure of proof and 
' 13. 
divide certain borderline or overlapping counties in the 
territories served by four Mid-western cycle 
distributors." 237 F.Supp., at 342. The court described 
the violation as a "division of territory by agreement 
/ 
between the distributors •.• horizontal in nature," and 
held that Schwinn's participation did not change that 
basic characteristic. Id., at The District Court 
I~ limited injuncti~ Ae\IQ\'e~ to the territorial 
restrictions on the resale of bicycles purchased by the 
distributors. Ibid. 
Schwinn carne to this Court on appeal by the 
United States from the District Court's decision. The 
Government abandoned its ~ se theor~ in favor of a 
rule of reason analysis of j)chwinn's marketing practices. 
The Government argued that Schwinn's prohibition against 
distributors and retailers selling Schwinn bicyclces to 
non-franchised dealers was unreasonable under § 1 and that 





decision on exclusive distributor territories where the 
bicyclyes had been sold. 
As presented in the Government's appeal, 
Schwinn invofved "challenged vertical restrictions as to 
territory and dealers" imposed by the manufacturer on its 
distributors and retailers. 388 u.s., at The Court 
acknowledged the Government's abandonment of its~ se 
theor~ of illegality under § 1 and stated that the 
resolution of the case required it to "look to the 
specifics of the challenged piactices and their impact 
upon the marketplace in order to make a judgment as to 
whether the restraint is or is not 'reasonable' in the 
special sense in which § 1 of the Sherman Act must be read 
for purposes of this type of inquiry." 388 U.S., at 374 • 
Despite this restrained description of its task, the Court 
proceeded to articulate a "bright line" ~ se rule of 
illegality under § 1 for vertical restrictions. 13/ The 
15. 
opinion in Schwinn makes clear, the crucial analytical 
element in . this ~ se rule is the notion of parting with 
atitle, dominion, or risk with respect to the article" by 
the manufacturer. Ibid. 
Applying the rule to the facts of Schwinn, the 
Court reached sharply contrasting results depending upon 
the role played hy the distributor in the distribution 
system. With respect to that portion of Schwinn's sales 
I 
for .which the distributors acted as ordinary wholesalers, 
buying and reselling Schwinn bicycles, the Court held that 
the territorial and customer restrictions challenged by 
the Government were ~ ~ illegal. . But, with respect to 
that larger protion of Schwinn's sales in which the 
distributors functianed under the Schwinn Plan and under 
the less common consignment and agency arrangements, the 
Court held that the same restrictions should be judged 
under the rule of reason. The only retail restriction 
and retailers, for it held that: 
"The principle is, of course, equally 
applicable to sales to retailers, and 
the decree should similarly enjoin the 
making of any sales to retailers upon 
any condition, agreement or understanding 
limiting the retailer's freedom as to 
where and to whom it will resell the 
products." 388 u.s~, at 378. 
16. 
Applying .the rule of reason to the restrictions that were 
not imposed in conjunction with the sale of bicycle~, the 
Court had little difficulty finding them all reasonable in 
light of the competitive situation in "the product mark~t 
as a whole." 388 u.s., at 382. 
B 
We first consider whether the present case can 
be distinguished from Schwinn. There being no dispute 
that tit~ the television sets passed from Sylvania 
to Continental, the Schwinn ~ se rule would apply here 
unless the locations policy falls outside the prohibition 
17. 
restriction of territory. The issue, therefore, is 
w~ether the necessary holding in Schwinn also encompasses 
this case. 
Under a functional analysis, a reasoned 
distinction of the present case from Schwinn is simply not 
possible. Both Schwinn and Sylvania sought to reduce but 
not to eliminate intrabrand competition among their 
retailers through the adoption of a franchise system. 
Although it was not one of the issues addressed by the 
District Court or presented on appeal by the Government, 
the Schwinn franchise plan included a locations policy 
policies allowed Schwinn and Sylvania to 
amount of intrabrand competition by preventing a 
franchisee from selling franchised products from outlets 
other than the one covered by the franchise agreement. To 
exactly the same end, the Schwinn franchise system 
included a comoanion restraint. aooarentlv not found in 
18. 
( bU-H"~:/ 
f;;b~ri~ In intent and~mpetitive impact, the retail 
customer restriction in Schwinn is indistinguishable from 
the locations clause in the present case. In both cases 
the restrict1ons interfered with the freedom of the 
retailer to dispose of the purchased products as he 
desired. The fact that one restriction was addressed to 
territory and the other to customers seems irrelevant to 
antitrust policy and, indeed, to the broad thrust of the 
.,l\ 
opinion in Schwinn. 14/ 
c 
1 
In the ten years since Schwinn was decided, 
the antitrust doctrine established there has been the 
subject of escalating controversy and confusf ion, both in 
the scholarly journals and in the federal courts. The 
great weight of scholarly opinion has been critical of the 
decision, 15/ and a number of the federal courts 
"---~~~~~··1t.r)l9. 
analysis of ~ t!:JOISQ pFe•,ri Iii io~• i:. WA ~l:9ar. After ten ~ears, 
. \ \ 




The Aframework of analysis u.nder § 1 of the 
Sherman Act is familiar and does not require extended 
discussion. Section 1 prohibits "[e]very contract, 
combination ••• or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce,." ~ S ince the early years . of this century f a 
judicial gloss on this statutory language has ~ made 
'? .'..~!! · e...-..t .. .; ?uC:, 
the "rule of reason" the prevailing standard of analysis. 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 u.s. 1 (1911). 
Under the rule of reason, the fact finder weighs all of 
the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a 
restrictive practice should be prohibited as 
· anti-competitive. 18/ Per se rules of illegality are 
discrete and carefully defined exceptions to this gene ral 
standard. As the Court explained in Northern Pac. R .. Co. 
lfp/ss 5/25/77 Rider A, p. 20 (Sylvania) 
The first case to reach this Court involving a location 
restriction imposed by a vertical agreement was White 
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). The 
manufacturer there sold its trucks to retailers and 
wholesalers under agreements imposing territorial and 
customer restrictions on their resale that were more 
stringent than those presently before us. Although urged 
to do so the Court in White Motor refused to establish 
~ 
a per se of invalidity with respect to such restrictions, 
'\ 
and remanded the case saying: 
"We need to know more than we do about the 
actual impact of these arrangements on 
competition to decide whether they have such 
a 'pernicious effect on competition and lack 
• • • any redeeming virtue 1 • • • • " Id. , at 
263 . 
Only four years later in Schwinn, and without citation 
of Northern Pacific, or specific reference:to its critical 
language, the Court announced the per se rule of illegality 
with respect to vertical location restrictions that it had 
disclaimed sufficient knowledge to endorse in White Motor. 
The Court simply held, without economic analysis, that 
"[s]uch restraints are so obviously destructive of 
n""'"'.o ... .f+-.f _ 4-'J....-"' ..... ...,.\...-.:- __ ....., __ ------.3.-.;..-..-.-- .1.- ---- ... - --L r;l 'lOO 
occasion to consider the reasonableness or the likely 
economic effect of the restraints before us. The answer 
follows "obviously" from the mere description of the 
location clause in the agreement quite without regard 
to its purpose or effect or the market conditions that 
may have prompted the restriction. We are unwilling , 
however, to endorse this broad exception to the normal 
rule of reason applicable to § 1 of the Sherman Act , at 
least without making the an,l~ical inquiry that the 
Schwinn Court apparently thought was unnecessary . In 
undertaking this, the relevant question - as stated in 
Northern Pacific - is whether agreements of this type 
have such a 1pernicious effect on competition and [are 
so lacking in] any redeeming virtue" as to justify a 
2 . 
conclusive presumption of unreasonableness and resulting \ 
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20. 
they have caused or the business excuse for their use." 19/ 
Although 
~~~~"­
Co. A~s~~e~iy informed 
Court's earlier refusal in White 
States, 372 u.s. 253 (1963), to 
vertical restrictions was based 
Motor Co. v. United 
!Bi... ...s 
create ~ se rulef> for ..,._ 
explicitly on its 
uncertainty as to whether such restrjctions satisfied the 
s!? 
conditions of "pernicious effect on competition" and "lack 
~ .. ·ft~-~~ 
of any redeeming virtue" s ~ a te~ in Northern Pac. R. Co. 
' ' " 
j n Schwinn resolved its earlier uncertainties in 
favor of a ~ se rule of illegality, but only after 
concluding that "[s]uch restraints are so obviously 
u.. 
destrl ctive of competition that their mere existence is 
enough." 388 u.S., at !~Thus, ~ur - --·-
\schwinn involves the application of an accepted legal 
~d t~ a class of commercial practic:.:._ .-.... 
2 
21. 
sale transactions are ~ se illegal, but restrictions 
imposed~with non-sale transactions are 
judged under - the rule of reason. We begin our 
reconsideration of Schwinn with an examination of this 
basic distinction in light of Northern Pac. R. Co. 
As the Court recognized in Schwinn, the market 
impact 20/ of vertical restrictions is complex and 
controversial because two potentially contradictory forces 
are at work. Such restrictions may at the same time 
... , ... , reduce the intrabrand competition among the businesses 
involved in the marketing of the franchised product and 
increase the efficiency of the manufacturer's marketing 
operation, thus stimulating interbrand competition • . 21/ 
~ a.A~~"l~·-~ ~ ) 
Both effectst\fetlnd ~ression in the Court' s=op1n1on/ !\~ 
Schwinn's ~..!:. se rule is based on the conclusion that 
post-sale vertical restrictions are "so obviously 
u 
22. 
·vertical restrictions can contribute to marketing 
~ 
efficiencies thatl\ay promote interbrand competition. The 
-court feared that a more complete prohibition "might 
severely hamper smaller ente~prises resorting to 
reasonable methods of meeting the competition of giants 
and merchandising through independent dealers, and [that] 
it might sharply accelerate the trend towards vertical 
integration of the distribution process." 
,a_ & -?_t_ is ·plear that the decision in Schwinn 
~-2~~erceived intrabrand 
competitive loss and interbrand cornpetive gain. ~/ The 
~ 
question is whether that balance was correctly struck, 25/ 
a question made more difficult by its rather conclusory 
treatment in Schwinn. The relevant inquiry under Northern 
Pac. R. Co. is, h6wever, clear. !A or~er for tbe 
"7t-t-
distinction between 1\ . 
(' d 4oo 4.- ...&-c._ 
sale and non-sale transactions te be 
~~ ~tai~ed~ - it mustjforrespond to a substantial dlfference 
I 




The form of the transaction is not one 
influencing the level of intrabrand competition. 
ql ~ It is elementary economicj that, other things being equal, 
I ~ 





the competition. Vertical restrictions may reduce 
intrabrand competition by limiting the number of sellers 
competing for the business of a given group of buyers. 
There is no dispute that a locations 
~b-. 
effect, ~it womewhat less directly than other forms of 
A 
restrictions. Whatever the form of the restriction, 
~ 
however, intrabrand competition depeds on the number of 
" 
-6 
~ ~-4-tL.U ~ ,w ~4<.~<?....-v ~ 
sellers having access to a 9~"QA tjrettp ef 8ttyer61v not on J 
. ,.. 
the manner in which the sellers obtained the goods. 26/ 
interbrand 
The opinion in Schwinn does not assert that 
~~~~'~a.J... ~ 
competitive advantage .1\i"heres p;r;@riJemiPlfi~t!ly iA. 
~ ~~~ 
:) · ~~~::.,·.}:'.:'";?>l>' .. ~e..rt ical restrictions~ imposed in non-sale A transactions. 
Nor =~ ... ~~~,;;t~~~ort for that view. 
24. 
- smaller companies is that the independent businesses 
involved in the .distribution of the product provide their 
own capital. Consignment and agency arrangements, 
however, require the manufacturer to finance the cost of 
inventory carried by the distributors. Similarly, a 
distribution scheme like the Schwinn Plan may require more 
elaborate and expensive administrative procedures than a 
small company can afford. 27/ 
~or tAQ re~eA~ &eate~ aee~,~e conclude that 
the Schwinn per se rule cannot be justified under ~ 
Northern Pac. R. Co. The question remains, however, 
whether the appropriate response is to expand (o!~ to 
contrac~the ru~e or to abandon it altogether. In 
considering these alternatives, we are guided by the 
standards discussed above. Under those standards a heavy 
burden of proof lies on those who support a ~ se rule. 
In contrast, we need not -be persuaded that vertical 
restrictions always work for the competitive good in order 
25. 
~arketing of their products, a goal consistent with § 1. 
~ dlc 
Wfiile it ~Rnet be t't@PtiQ.a tl=tat such restrictions 
. A 
~~~~.,4·""'1,..o' . 
with the free ; ay of competitive forces in the 
~ . 
distribution of the franchised products, p.!'O~oReR t s argue 
~ the risk of overall competitive harm is acceptably 
small. 28/ The view that the economic interests of 
manufacturer and consumers are compatible is central to 
this position. Although some diminution of intrabrand 
copetition may be necessary, the manufacturer has a 
t:;.4- ' 0 
~~;1 interest in assuring the maximum intrabrand 
competition con$istent with the efficient marketing of his 
product. 29/ 
. .. ·. 
Proponents assert that a variety of 
competitive objectives can be achieved through vertical 
restrictions 30/ A manufacturer might seek nothing more 
. a.,.. 
than to assure that fi+s retailers operate at the most 
efficient scale, a result that ~ultimatelyl be reached 




.ft4.s retailers somewhat more than competitive market 
power. For example, a new manufacturer or a manufacturer 
entering a new market may find it necessary to offer a 
somewhat higher return in order to induce competent and 
. ,J:._ 
aggressive retailers to distribute ft4.5 products. It also 
has been suggested that the combination of vertical 
restrictions and intrabrand competition might be used to 
induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to 
provide maintenance and repair facilitites necessary to 
i:L.-
the efficient marketing of ~ products. Because of 
market imperfections such as the so-called "free rider" 
effect, these necessary services might not be provided by 
retailers in a ~competitive situation, despite the 
fact that each retailer's benefit would be greater if all 
provided the services than if none did. 31/ Ii:: iii .true 
~~~_Sf 1- +cec:: Jc::ae. 
~~ services o'f ~Q~e t;¥P~ could be provided in other 
ways, but the fact that manufacturers choose to use 
vertical rstrictions strongly suggests that the other ways 
27. 
serviced. As a result of statutory and common law 
developments, society increasingly demands that 
manufacturers assume direct responsibility for the safety 
and quality ~f their products. For example, at the 
federal level, apart from more specialized requirements, 
all manufacturers of consumer products have safety 
responsibilities under the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 
/ 
U.S.C. § 2051 et seq., and obligations for warranties 
under the Consumer Product warranties Act, 15 u.s.c. 
S 2301 et seq. Similar obligations are imposed by state 
law. See, ~' California Civil Code § 1709 ~! ~· 
The argument most frequently advanced against 
vertical restrictions is, in effect, that they are too 
successful ·in inducing retailers to promote the franchised 
products. The critics argue that consumer loyalties for 
particular brands are strengthened by such promotion to 
the detriment of interbrand competition. This argument 
28. 
problem. Prohibition of vertical restrictions would not 
.. 
necessarily end the type of promotion to which the critics 
object but might simply result in the promotion being done 
~ by less efficient, more costly methods -- arguably 
socially undesirable result. 
The most commonly acknowledged competitive 
risk from vertical restrictions is that they will not be 
. truly vertical, but rather the result of a horizontal 
agreement among retailers imposed on an unwilling 
manufacturer. In such a case, the manufacturer's economic 
interest would no longer serve as a check on the 
dist~ anti-competitive interests of the retailers, 
and there is no doubt that the agreement would be illegal 
Eer se. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 
127 (1966); United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 
e some difficu t1es in 
of the restrictions in a given 
29. 
E!:E. se prohibition. There are troubling anti-competitive 
problems with vertical restrictions. But these problems 
are not pervasive, and their evaluation is a question of 
degree involving a number of factors. 
Nor are we able at this time to identify any 
discrete situations justifying partial ~ se rules. 33/ 
Franchise agreements may include a variety of provisions 
restricting the parties. An exclusive franchise is a 
promise by the manufacturer not to franchise ~ny other 
retailers in a particular area. Provisions imposing 
restrictions on retailers include customer restrictions, 
territorial restrictions, locations clauses, 
profit-passover clauses, and primary responsibility 
clauses. Although distinctions can be drawn among these 
restrictions, we are inclined to view them as constituting 
only differences of degree and form. l!l Even 
Continental does not urge us to make all such restrictions 
~ se illegal; yet, we are unable to perceive significant 
29- A 
another. Were we to do so, the argument would 
inevitably be made that permissible forms were being 
used to achieve impermissible results. Resolution 
of these disputes 
30. 
would involve inquiries closely resembling rule of reason 
inquiries. 
Both because we take a more sanguine view of 
.. · ..· 
vertical restrict ions in general q.nd · -Qe.cra-use we perceive 
. ' ., , 
no new line of demarcation that could be sustained under 
Northern Pac. R. Co., we believe that the appropriate 
decision is to revert to the rule of reason analysis that 
governed vertical restrictions before Schwinn. Whatever 
anticompetitive effects may flow from vertical 
restrictions can be adequately policed under the rule of 
reason, which is the standard applied to the vast majority 
of rest(~ct i ve practices challenged under § 1. 
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CONTINENTAL T.V., INC. 
v. 
GTE SYLVANIA INC. 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of 
the Court: 
Franchise agreements between manufacturers and 
retailers frequently include provisions barring the 
~etailers from sel~ing franchised products from locations 
other than those specified in the agreements. This case 
presents important questions concerning the appropriate 
antitrust analysis of these restrictions under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Court's decision in 
_!:!nite_Q States v. Arnold, Schwinn &_ Co., 388 U.S. 365 
(1967). 
I 
Respondent GTE Sylvania, Inc. ("Sylvania") 
manufactures and sells television sets th~ough its Home 
Entertainment Products Division. Prior to 1962, like most 
other television manufacturers, Sylvania sold its 
televisions to independent or company-owned distributors 
2. 
who in turn resold to a large and diverse group of 
retailers. Prompted by a decline in its market share to a 
relatively insignificant 1 to 2 percent of national 
television sales, !/ Sylvania conducted an intensive 
reassessment of its marketing strategy, and in 1962 
adopted the franchise plan challenged here. Sylvania 
phased out its wholesale distributors and began to sell 
its televisions directly to a smaller and more select 
group of franchised retailers. An acknowledged purpose of 
the change was to decrease the number of competing 
Sylvania retailers in the hope of attracting the more 
aggressive and competent retailers thought necessary to 
the improvement of the company's market position. 11 To 
this end, Sylvania Jimited the number of franchises 
granted for any given area and required each franchisee to 
sell his Sylvania products only from the location or 
locations at which he was franchised. }/ A franchise did 
not constitute an exclusive territory, and Sylvania 
retained sole discretion to increase the number of 
retailers in an area in light of the success or failure of 
existing retailers in developing their market. The 
revised marketing strategy appears to have been successful 
during the period at issue here, for by 1965 Sylvani~'s 
share of na~ional television sales had increased to 
approximately 5 percent, and the company ranked as the 
3. 
nation's eighth largest manufacturer of color television 
sets. 
This suit is the result of the rupture of a 
franchisor-franchisee relationship that had previously 
prospered under the revised ·sylvania plan. Dissatisfied 
with its sales in the City of San Francisco, !/ Sylvania 
decided in the spring of 1965 to franchise Young Brothers, 
an established San Francisco retailer of televisions, as 
an additional San Francisco retailer. The proposed 
location of the new franchise was approximately a mile 
from a retail outlet operated by petitioner Continental 
T.V., Inc. ("Continental"), one of the most successful 
Sylvania franchisees. ~/ Continental protested that the 
location of the new franchise violated Sylvania's 
marketing policy, but Sylvania persisted in its pl. ans~ 
Continental then cancelled a large Sylvania order and 
placed a large order with Phillips, one of Sylvania's 
competitors. 
During this same period, Continental expressed 
a desire to open a store in Sacramento, California, a 
desire Sylvania attributed at least in part to 
Continental's displeasure over the Young . Brothers 
decision. Sylvania believed that the Sacramento market 
was adequately served by the existing Sylvania retailers 
and denied the request. ~/ In the faGe of this denial, 
4. 
Continental advised Sylvania in early September 1965 that 
it was in the process of moving Sylvania merchandise from 
its San Jose, California, warehouse to a new retail 
location that it had leased in Sacramento. Two weeks 
later, allegedly for unrelated reasons, Sylvania's credit 
department reduced Continental's credit line from $300,000 
to $50,000. 21 In response to the reduction jn credit 
and the generally deteriorating relations with Sylvania, 
Continental withheld all payments owed to ~ohn P. Maguire 
& Co. , Inc. {"Maguire") , the finance company that handled 
the credit arrangements between Sylvania and its 
retailers. Shortly thereafter, Sylvania terminated 
Continental's franchises, and Maguire filed this diversity 
action in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California seeking recovery of money 
owed and of secured merchandise held by Continental. 
The antitiust issues before us originated in 
crossclaims brought by Continental against Sylvania and 
Maguire. Most important for our purposes was the claim 
that Sylvania had vjolated § 1 of the Sherman Act by 
entering into and enforcing franchi~e agreements that 
prohibited the sale of Sylvania products other than from 
specified locations. ~/ At the close of evidence in the 
jury trial of Continental's claims, Sylvania requested the 
District Court to instruct the jury that its location 
5. 
restriction was illegal only if it unreasonably restrained 
or suppressed competition. App., at 5-6, 9-15. Relying 
on this Court's decision in United States v. Arnold, 
Schwinn & Co., 388 u.s. 365 (1967), the District Court 
rejected the proffered instruction in favor of the 
following one: 
"Therefore, if you find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Sylvania entered into a 
contract, combination or conspiracy with 
one or more of its dealers pursuant to 
which Sylvania exercised dominion or control 
over the products sold to the dealer, after 
having parted with title and risk to the 
products, you must find any effort there-
after to restrict outlets or store locations 
from which its dealers resold the merchandise 
which they had purchased from Sylvania to be a 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
regardless of the reasonableness of the 
location restrictions." App., at 492. 
In answers to special interrogatories, the jury found that 
Sylvania had engaged "in a contract, combination, or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade with respect to location 
restrictions alone," and assessed Continental's damages 
at $591,505, which was trebled pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15 
to produce an award of $1,774,515. App., at 49S., 501. 2/ 
On appeal, the Court of .1\ppeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, sitting en ~anc, reversed by a divided vote. 537 
F.2d 980 (1976). The court acknowledged that there is 
language in Schwinn that could be read to support the 
District Court's instruction but concluded that Schwinn 
. ~ · -· 
6. 
was distinguishable on several grounds. Contrasting the 
nature of the restrictions, their competitive impact, and 
the market shares of the franchipors in the two cas es, the 
court concluded that Sylvania's location restriction had 
less potential for competitive harm thari the restrictions 
invalidated in §ch~inn and thus should be judged under the 
"rule of reason" rather than the ~.£ se rule stated in 
Schwinn. The court found support for its position in the 
policies of the Sherman Act and in the decisions of othei 
federal courts involving non-p r ice vertical 
restrictions. 10/ 
We granted Continental's petition for 
certiorari to resolve this important question of antitrust 
law. u.s. (1976) ~ 11/ 
II 
A 
We turn first to Continental's contention that 
Sylvania's restriction on retail locations is a ~.£ ~e 
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act as interpreted in 
Schwinn. The restrictions at issue in Schwinn were part · 
of a three-tier distribution system comprising, in 
addition to Arnold, Schwinn & Co. ("Schwinn"), 22 
intermediate distributors and a network of franchised 
retailers. Each distributor had a defined geographic area 
in which it had the exclusive right to supply franchised 
7. 
retailers. Sales to the public were made only through 
franchised retailers, who were authorized to sell Schwinn 
bicycles only from specified locations. In support of 
this limitation, Schwinn prohibited both distributors and 
retailers from selling Schwinn bicycles to non-franchised 
retailers. At the retail level, therefore, Schwinn was 
able to control the number of retailers of its bicycles in 
any given area according to its view of the needs of that 
market. 
As of 1967 approximately 75 percent of 
Schwinn's total sales were made under the "Schwinn Plan." 
Acting essentially as a manufacturer's representative or 
sales agent, a distributor participating in this plan 
forwarded orders from retailers to the factory. Schwinn 
then shipped the ordered bicycles directly to the 
retailer, billed the retailer, bore the credit risk, and 
paid the distributor a commission on the sale. Under th~ 
Schwinn Plan, the distributor never had title to or 
possession of the bicycles. The remainder of the. bicycles 
moved to the retailers through the hands of the 
distributors. For the most part the distributors 
functioned as traditional wholesalers with respect to 
these sales, stocking an inventory of bicycles owned by 
them to supply retailers with emergency and "fill-in" 
requirements. A smaller part of the bicyriles that were 
8. 
physically distributed by the distributors were covered by 
consignment and agency arrangements that had been 
developed to deal with particular problems of certain 
distributors. Distributors acquired title only to those 
bicycles that they purchased as wholesaJ.ers; retailers, of 
course, acquired title to all of the bicycles sold by them. 
In the District Court, the United States 
charged a continuing conspiracy by Schwinn and other 
alleged co-conspirators to fix prices, allocate exclusive 
territories to distributors, and confine Schwinn bicycles 
to franchised retailers. Relying on United States v. 
Bausch & Lomb co;, 321 U.S. 707 (1944), the Government 
argued that the non-price restrictions were E~~ se illegal 
as part of a scheme for fixing the retail prices of 
Schwinn bicycles. The District Court rejected the 
price-fixing allegation because of a failure of proof and 
held that Schwinn's limitation of retail bicycle sales to 
franchised retailers was permissible under § 1. The court 
found a S 1 violation, however, in "a conspiracy to divid~ 
certain borderline or overlapping counties in the 
territories served by four Mid-western cycle 
distributors." 237 F.Supp., 323, 342 (N.D. Ill. 1965). 
The court described the violation as a qdivision of 
territory by agreement between the distributors 
horizontal in nature," and held that Schwinn's 
9. 
participation did not change that basic characteristic. 
Id., at 342. The District Court limited its injunction to 
apply only to the territorial restrictions on the resale 
of bicycles purchased by the distributors in their roles 
as wholesalers. Ibid. 
Schwinn came to this Court on appeal by the 
United States from the District Court's decision. 
Abandoning its ~ se theories, the Government argued that 
Schwinn's prohibition against distributors and retailers 
selling Schwinn bicycles to non-franchised retailers was 
unreasonable under § 1 and that the District Court's 
injunction against exclusive distributor territories 
should extend to all such restrictions regardless of the 
form of the .transaction. The Government did not challenge 
the District Court's decision on price-fixing, and Schwinn 
did not challenge the decision on exclusive distributor 
territories. 
The Court acknowledged the Government's 
abandonment of its 12er se theories and stated that the 
resolution of the case would require an examination of 
"the specifics of the challenged practices and their 
impact upon the marketplace in order to make a judgment as 
to whether the restraint is or is not 'reasonable' in the 
special sense in which § 1 of the Sherman Act must be read 
for purposes of this type of inquiry." 388 U.S., at . 374. 
10. 
Despite this description of its task, the Court proceeded 
to articulate the following "bright line" pe_£ se rule of 
illegality for vertical restrictions: "Under the Sherman 
Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to 
seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an 
article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted 
with dominion over it." Id~ at 379. But the Court 
expressly stated that the rule of reason governs when "the 
manufacturer retains title, dominion, and risk with 
respect to the product and the position and function of 
the dealer in question are, in fact, indistinguishable 
from those of an agent or salesman of the manufacturer." 
Id., at 380. 
Application of these principles to the facts 
of Schwinn proouced sharply contrasting results depending 
upon the role played by the distributor in the 
distribution system. With respect to that portion of 
Schwinn's sales for which the distributors acted as 
ordinary wholesalers, buying and reselling Schwinn 
bicycles, the Court held that the territorial and customer 
restrictions challenged by the Government were ~ se 
illegal. But, with respect to that larger portion of 
Schwinn's sales in which the distributors functioned under 
the Schwinn Plan and under the less common consignment and 
agency arrangements, the Court held that the same 
restrictions should be judged under. the rule of reason. 
The only retail restriction challenged by the Government 
prevented franchised retailers from supplying 
non-franchised retailers. Id., at 377. The Court 
apparently perceived no material distinction between the 
restrictions on distributors and retailers, for it held 
that: 
"The principle is, of course, equally 
~pplicable to sales to retailers, and 
the decree should similarly enjoin the 
making of any sales to retailers upon 
any condition, agreement or understanding 
limiting the retail~r's freedom as to 
where and to whom it will resell the 
products." Id., at 378. 
11. 
Applying the rule of reason to the restrictions that were 
not imposed in conjunction with the sale of bicycles, the 
Court had little difficulty finding them all reasonable in 
light of the competitive situation in "the product market 
as a whole." Id., at 382. 
B 
In the present case, it is undisputed that 
title to the televisions passed from Sylvania to 
Continental. Thus, the Schwinn ~ se rule applies unless 
Sylvania's restriction on locations falls outside 
Schwinn's prohibition against a manufacturer attempting to 
restrict a "retailer's freedom ·as to where and to whom it 
will resell the products." Id., at 378. As the Court of 
12. 
Appeals conceded, the language of Schwinn is clearly broad 
enough to apply to the present case. Unlike the Court of 
Appeals, however, we are unable to find a principled basis 
for distinguishing Schwinn from the case now before us. 
Both Schwinn and Sylvania sought to reduce 
but not to eliminate competition among their respective 
retailers through the adoption of a franchise system. 
Although it was not one of the issues addressed by the 
District Court or presented on appeal by the Government, 
the Schwinn franchise plan included a location restriction 
similar to the one challenged here. These restrictions 
allowed Schwinn and Sylvania to regulate the amount of 
competition among their retailers by preventing a 
franchisee from selling franchised products from outlets 
other than the one covered by the franchise agreement. To 
exactly the same end, the Schwinn franchise plan included 
a companion restriction, apparently not found in the 
Sylvania plan, that prohibited franchised retailers from 
selling Schwinn products to non-franchised retailers. In 
Schwinn the Court expressly held that this restriction was 
impermissible under the broad principle stated there. In 
intent and competitive impact, the retail customer 
restriction in Schwinn is indistinguishable from the 
location restriction in the present case. In both cases 
the restrictions limited the freedom of the retailer to 
13. 
dispose of the purchased products as he desired. The fact 
that one restriction was addressed to territory and the 
other to customers seems irrelevant to functional 
antitrust analysis and, indeed, to the language and broad 
thrust of the opinion in Schwinn. 12/ 
III 
Sylvania argues that if Schwinn cannot be 
distinguished, it should be reconsidered. Although 
Schwinn is supported by the principle of ~tare decisis, 
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, u.s. 
(1977), we are convinced that the need for clarification 
of the law in this area justifies reconsideration. 
Schwinn itself was an abrupt and largely unexplained 
departure from White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 
253 (1963), where only four years earlier the Court had 
refused to endorse a ~ se rule for vertical 
restrictions. Since its announcement, Schwinn has been 
the subject of continuing controversy and confusion, both 
in the scholarly journals and in the federal courts. The 
great weight of scholarly opinion has been critical of the 
decision, 13/ and a number of the federal courts 
confronted with analogous vertical restrictions have 
sought to limit its reach. ~I In our view, the 
' 
experience of the past ten years should be brought to bear 
on this subject of considerable commercial importance. 
The traditional framework of analysis under 
§ 1 of the Sherman Act is familiar and does not require 
extended discussion. Section 1 prohibits "fe]very 
14. 
contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce." Since the eatly years of this century 
a judicial gloss on this statutory language has 
established the "rule of reason" as the prevailing 
standard of analysis. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 
221 U.S. 1 (1911}. Under this rule, the fact finder 
weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding 
whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as 
anti-competitive. 15/ Per se rules of illegality are 
discrete and carefully defined exceptions to this general 
standard. As the Court explained in Northern Pac. R. Co. 
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958}, "there are ce(tain 
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious 
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are 
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore 
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm 
they have caused or the business excuse for their 
use." (Emphasis added}. 16/ 
In essence, the issue before us is whether 
Schwinn's ~ se rule can be · justified under the demanding · 
standards of Northern Pac. R. Co. The Court's refusal to 
endorse a ~ se rule in White Motor Co. was based on its 
15. 
uncertainty as to whether vertical restrictions satisfied 
those standards. Addressing this question for the first 
time, the Court stated: 
"We need to know more than we do about 
the actual impact of these arrangements 
on competition to decide whether they have 
such a 'pernicious effect on competition 
and lack . . . any redeeming virtue'. . " 
372 U.S., at 263, quoting Northern Pac. R. Co. 
v. United States, supra, at 5. 
Only four years later the Court in Schwinn announced its 
sweeping ~ se rule without even a reference to Northern 
Pac. R. Co. and with no explanation of its sudden change 
in position. !2/ We turn now to consider Srihwinn . in 
light of Northern Pac. R. Co. 
The market impact of vertical restric-
tions 18/ is complex because of their potential for a 
simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and 
stimulation of interbrand competition. ~/ 
Significantly, the Court in Schwinn did not distinguish 
among the challenged restrictions on the basis of their 
individual potential for intrabrand harm or interbrand 
benefit. Restrictions that completely eliminated 
intrabrand competition among Schwinn distributors were 
analyzed no differently than those that merely moderated 
intrabrand competition among retailers. The pivotal 
factor was the passage of title: All restrictions were 
held to be per se illegal where title had passed, and all 
16. 
were evaluated and sustained under the rule of reason 
where it had not. The location restriction at issue here 
would be subject to the same pattern of analysis under 
Schwinn. 
It appears that this distinction between sale 
and non-sale transactions resulted from the Court's effort 
to accommodate the perceived intrabrand harm and 
interbrand benefit of vertical restrictions. The per se 
rule for sale transactions reflected the view that 
vertical restrictions are "so obviously destructive" of 
intrabrand competition 20/ that their use would "open 
the door to exclusivity of outlets and limitation of 
territory further than prudence permits." 388 U.S., at 
379, 380. 21/ Conversely, the continued adherence to the 
traditional rule of reason for non-sale transactions 
reflected the view that the restrictions have too great a 
potential for the promotion of interbrand competition to 
justify complete prohibition. ~/ The Court's opinion 
provides no analytical support for these contrasting 
positions. Nor is there even an assertion in the opinion 
that the competitive impact of vertical restrictions is 
significantly affected by the form of the transaction. 
Non-sale transactions appear to be excluded from the ~ 
se rule, not because of a greater danger of intrabrand 
harm or a greater promise of interbrand benefit, but 
17. 
rather because of the Court'S unexplained belief that a 
complete per se prohibition would be too "inflexibile." 
Id., at 379. 
Vertical restrictions reduce intrabrand 
competition by limiting the number of sellers of a 
particular product competing for the business of a given 
group of buyers. Location restrictions have this effect 
because of practical constraints on the effective 
marketing area of retail outlets. Although intrabrand 
competition may be reduced, the ability of retailers to 
exploit the resulting market power may be limited both by 
the ability of consumers to travel to other franchised 
locations and, perhaps more importantly, to purchase the 
competing products of other manufacturers. None of these 
key variables, however, is affected by the form of the 
transaction by which a manufacturer conveys his products 
to the retailers. 
Vertical restrictions promote interbrand 
competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve 
certain efficiencies in the distribution of his produdts. 
These "redeeming virtues" are implicit in every decision 
sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of 
reason. Economists have identified a number of ways in 
' 
which manufacturers can use such restrictions to compete 
more effectively against other man~facturers. See, 
18. 
~, Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: 
Economic Analysis and Public Pcilicy Standards, 30 Law & 
Contemp. Prob. 506, 511 (1965). 23/ For example, new 
manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets. can 
use the restrictions to offer a somewhat higher return in 
order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to 
distribute their products. Established manufacturers can 
use them to induce retailers to engage in promotional 
activities or to provide service and repair facilities 
necessary to the efficient marketing of their products. 
Service and repair are vital for many products, such as 
automobiles and major household appliances. The 
availability and quality of such services affect a 
manufacturer's good will and the competitiveness of his 
product. Because of market imperfections such as the 
so-called ''free rider" effect, these services might not be 
provided by retailers in a purely competitive situation, 
despite the fact that each retailer's benefit would be 
greater if all provided the services than if none did. 
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price 
Fixing and Market Division II, 75 Yale L.J. 373, 403 
(1966) ~ Posner, supra n. 13, at 285~ cf. P. Samuelson, 
Economics 506-07 (lOth ed. 1976). 
Economists also have argued that manufacturers 
have an economic interest in maintaining as much 
19. 
intrabrand competition as is consistent with the efficient 
distribution of their products. Bark, supra, at 403; 
Posner, su~, n. 13, at 283, 287-288. lil Although the 
view that the manufacturer's interest necessarily 
corresponds with that of the public is not universally 
shared, even the leading critic of vertical restrictions 
concedes that Schwinn's distinction between sale and 
non-sale transactions is essentially unrelated to any 
relevant economic impact. Comanor, Vertical Territorial 
and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 
81 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1422 (1968) 25/ Indeed, to the 
extent that the form of the transaction is related to 
interbrand benefits, the Court's distinction is 
inconsistent ~ith its articulated concern for the ability 
of smaller firms to compete effectively with larger ones. 
Capital requirements and administrative expenses may 
prevent smaller firms from using the exception for 
non-sale transactions. See, e.g., McLaren, supra n. 13, 
at 145; Phillips, Schwinn Rules and the "New Economics" of 
Vertical Relationships, 44 Antitrust L.J. 573, 576 (1975); 
Pollock, supra n. 13, at 610. 26/ 
We conclude that there is no justification for 
the distinction drawn in Schwinn between sale and nonsale - --- ' 
transactions. The question remains whether the~~~ 
rule stated in Schwinn should be ~xpanded to include 
20. 
non-sale tra~s~ctions or abandoned in favor of a return to 
the rule of reason. We have found no persuasive support 
for expanding the rule. As noted above, the Schwinn Court 
recognized the undesirability of "prohibitfing] all 
vertical restrictions of territory and all franchising 
••• " 388 U.S., at 379, 380. !:.1_/ And even Continental 
does not urge us to hold that all such restrictions are 
~ se illegal. 
We revert to the standard articulated in 
Northern Pac. R. Co., and reiterated in White Motor, for 
determining whether vertical restrictions must be 
"conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore 
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm 
they have caused or the business excuse for their use". 
356 U.S., at 5. Such restrictions, in varying forms, are 
widely used in our free market economy. As indicated 
above, there is substantial scholarly and judicial 
authority supporting their social utility and economic 
soundness. There is relatively little authority to the 
contrary. 28/ Certainly, there has been no showing in 
this case, either generally or with respect to Sylvania's 
agreements, that verticaJ restrictions have or are likely 
to have a "pernicious effect on competition" or that they 
"lack ••. any redeeming virtue." 29/ Accordingly, we 
conclude that the 12er se rule stated in Schwinn· must be 
21. 
overruled. lQ./ In so holding we do not forecJose the 
possibility that particular applications of vertical 
restrictions might justify Eer se prohibition under 
Northern Pac. R. Co. But we do make clear that departure 
from the rule of reason standard must be based upon 
demonstrable economic effect rather than - as in Schwinn -
upon formalistic line-drawing. 
In sum, we conclude that the appropriate 
decision is to return to the rule of reaso~ that governed 
vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn. When competitive 
effects are shown to result from particular vertical 
restrictions they can be adequately policed under the rule 
of reason, the standard traditionally applied for the 
majority of anti-competitive practices challenged under § 
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FOOTNOTES 
!/ RCA at that time was the dominant firm 
with as much as as 60 to 70 percent of national television 
sales in an industry with more than 100 manufacturers. 
11 The number of retailers selling Sylvania 
products declined significantly as a result of the change, 
but in 1965 there were at least two franchised Syl~ania 
retailers in each metropolitan center of more than 100,000 
population. 
11 Sylvania imposed no restrictions on the 
right of the franchisee to sell the products of competing 
manufacturers. 
~/ Sylvania's market share in San Francisco 
was approximately 2.5 percent -- half its national .and 
Northern California average. 
~/ There are in fact four corporate 
petitioners: Continental T.V., Inc.: A & G Sales: Sylpac, 
Inc.: and S.A.M. Industries, Inc. All are owned in large 
part by the same individual, and all conducted business 
FN-2. 
under the trade style of "Continental T.V." We adopt the 
convention used by the court below of referring to 
petitioners collectively as "Continental." 
&I Sylvania had achieved exceptional results 
in Sacramento, where its market share exceeded 15 percent 
in 1965. 
21 In its findings of fact made in 
conjunction with Continental's plea for injunctive relief, 
the District Court rejected Sylvania's claim that its 
actions were prompted by independent concerns over 
Continental's credit. The jury's verdict is ambiguous on 
this point. In any event, we do not consider it relevant 
to the issue before us. 
~/ Although Sylvania contended in the 
District Court that its policy was unilaterally enforced, 
it now concedes that its location restriction involved 
understandings or agreements with the retailers. 
,. 
21 The jury also found that Maguire had not 
conspired with Sylvania with respect to this violation. 
Other claims made by Continental· were either rejected by 
the jury or withdrawn by Continental. Most important was 
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the jury's rejection of the allegation that the location 
restriction was part of a larger scheme to fix prices. A 
pendent claim that Sylvania and Maguire had willfully and 
maliciously caused injury to Continental's business in 
violation of California law also was rejected by the jury, 
and a pendent breach of contract claim was withdrawn by 
Continental during the course of the proceedings. The 
parties eventually stipulated to a judgment for Maguire on 
its claim against Continental. 
10/ There were two major dissenting 
opinions. Judge Kilkenny argued that the present case is 
indistinguishable from Schwinn and that the jury had been 
correctly instructed. Agreeing with Judge Kilkenny's 
interpretation of Schwinn, Judge Browning stated that 
hefound the interpretation responsive to and justified by 
the need to protect "individual traders from unnecessary 
restrictions upon their freedom of action." 537 F.2d, at 
1021. 
11/ This Court has never given plenary 
consideration to the question of the proper antitrust 
analysis of location restrictions. Before Schwinn such 
restrictions had been sustaiDed in Boro Hall Corp. v. 
General Motors Corp~, 112 F.2d 822 (CA 2 1942). Since the 
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decision in Schwinn, location restrictions have been 
sustained by three Courts of Appeals, including the 
decision belbw. Salce Corp. v. General Motors Corp. _, 517 
F.2d 567 (CA 10 1975); Kaiser v. Gen~ral Motors Corp., 396 
F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 530 
F.2d 964 (CA 3 1976). 
12/ Sylvania's suggested distinctjon focuses 
on a comparison of the likely diminution of intrabrand 
competition under the location clause and under the 
exclusive distributor territories in Schwinn and ignores 
the customer restrictions in Schwinn on the theory that 
Sylvania's franchise agreement embodied no similar 
provisions. Continental's response is that a location 
restriction also is capable theoretically of producing 
complete insulation from intrabrand competition. Despite 
this possibility, it seems more likely that only a 
manufacturer oblivious to its own interest in effective 
market development would use the policy to achieve that 
result. In any event, we consider the comparison drawn in 
the text to be the relevant one. As Chief Justice Hughes 
stated in ~palachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 
U.S. 344, 363, 377, "Realities must dominate the judgment 
•.•• The Anti-Trust Act aims at substance." 
FN-5 
l}l A former Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust has described Schwinn as "an exercise in barren 
formalism" that is "artificial and unresponsive to the 
competitive needs of the real world.'' Baker, Vertical 
Restraints in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to 
Where?, 44 Antitrust L.J. 537 (1975). See e.g., Handler, 
The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review -- 1967, 53 Va. L. 
Rev. 1667 (1967); McLaren, Territorial and Customer 
Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Retail Prices and 
Refusal to Deal, 37 Antitrust L.J. 137 (1968) t Pollock, 
Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. 
U.L. Rev. 595 (1968); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the 
Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted 
Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition 
Decisions, 75 Colum. L.J. 282 (1975); Robinson, Recent 
Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 243 
(1976); Note, Vertical Territorial and Customer 
Restrictions in the Franchising Industry, 10 Colum. J.L. & 
Soc. Prob. 497 (1974); Note, Territorial and Customer 
Restrictions: A Trend Toward a Broader Rule of Reason?, 40 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 123 (1971); Note, Territorial 
Restrictions and Per Se Rules -- A Reevaluation of the 
Schwinn and Sealy Doctrines, 70 Mich. L. Rev. (1972). But 
see Louis, Vertical Distributional Restraints Under 
Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing Use 
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of a Partial Per Se Approach~ Zimmerman, Distribution 
Restrictions After Se~ and Schwinn, 12 Antitrust Bull. 
1181 (1967). For a more inclusive list of articles and 
comments, see 537 F.2d, at 988 n.l3. 
lil Indeed, as one commentator has observed, 
many courts "have struggled to distinguish or limit 
Schwin~ in ways that are a tribute to judicial ingenuity." 
Robinson, supra n. 13, at 272. Thus, the statement in 
Schwinn that post-sale vertical restrictions as to 
customers or territories are "unreasonable without more," 
388 u.s., at 379, has been interpreted to allow an 
exception to the ~ se rule where the manufacturer proves 
"more" by showing that the restraints will protect 
consumers against injury and the manufacturer against 
product liability claims. See, e.g.:..., Tripoli Co. v. Wella 
Corp., 425 F. 2d 932, 936-938 (CA 3 1970) (en bane). 
Similarly, the statement that Schwinn's enforcement of its 
restrictions had been "firm and resolute,'; 388 u.s., at 
372, has been relied upon to distinguish cases lacking 
that element. See, ~' Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin 
Parfums Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 406 (CA 2 1968). Other 
factual distinctions have been drawn to justify upholding 
territorial restrictions that would seem to fall within 
the scope of the Schwinn ~ se rule. See, ~' Carter 
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Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1379-1381 
(Ct. Cl. 1971) (~£ se rule inappl i.cable when a purchaser 
can avoid the restraints by electing to buy the product at 
a higher price); Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, 
Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (CA 10 1973) (apparent territorial 
restriction characterized as primary responsibility 
clause). One Court of Appeals has expressly urged us to 
consider the need in this area for greater flexibility. 
Adolph Coors Co. v. F.T.C., 497 F.2d 1178, 1187 (CA 10 
1974). The decision Schwinn and the developments in the 
lower courts have been exhaustively surveyed in ABA 
Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 2, Vertical Restrictions 
Limiting Intrabrand Competition (1977). ["ABA Monograph 
No. 2"] • 
15/ One of the most frequently cited 
statements of the rule of reason is that of Justice 
Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 
u.s. 231, 238 (1918): 
"The true test of legality is whether 
the restraint imposed is such as merely 
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes 
competition or whether it is such as roay 
suppress or even destroy competition. 
To determine that question the court must 
ordinarily consider the facts peculiir to 
the business to which the restraint is 
applied; its condition before and after the 
restraint was imposed; the nature of the 
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. 
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The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting 
the particular remedy, the purpose or end 
sought to be attained, are all relevant 
facts. This is not because a good intention 
will save an otherwise objectionable regula-
tion or the reverse; but because knowledge 
of the intent may help the court to interpret 
facts and to predict consequences." 
16/ Per se rules thus require the Court to 
make broad generalizations about the social utility of 
particular commercial practices. The probability that 
anti-competitive consequences will result from a practice 
and the severity of those consequences must be balanced 
against its pro-competitive consequences. Cases that do 
not fit the generalization may arise, but a ~ se rule 
reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently 
common or important to justify the time and expense 
necessary to identify them. Once established, Eer se 
rules tend to provide guidance to the business community 
and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial 
system of the more comp~ex rule of reason trials, see 
Northern Pac. R. Co. v; United States, 356 U.S.l, 5 
(1958); United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 
609-610 (1972), but those advantages are not sufficient in 
themselves to justify the creation of Eer se rules. If it 
were otherwise, all of antitrust law would be reduced to 
~ se rules, thus introducing an unintended and 
undesirable rigidity in the law. 
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17/ After White Motor Co., the Coutts of 
Appeals continued to evaluate territorial restrictions 
according to the rule of reason. Sandura Co. v. ~T.C., 
339 F.2d 847 (CA 6 1964); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. F.T.C., 
321 F.2d 825 (CA 7 1963). For an exposition of the 
history of the antitrust analysis of vertical restrictions 
before Schwinn, see ABA Monograph No. 2, suEra n. 14, at 
6-7. I 
lJ!_/ As in Schwinn, we are concerned here 
only with non-price vertical restrictions. The ~ se 
illegality of price restrictions has been established 
firmly for many years and involves significantly different 
questions of analysis and policy. 
19/ Interbrand competition is the 
competition between the manufacturers of the same generic 
product -- television sets in this case -- and is the 
primary concern of antitrust law. The extreme example of 
a deficiency of interbrand competition is monopoly, where 
there is only one manufacturer. In contrast, intrabrand 
competition is the competition between the distributors 
wholesale or retail -- of the product of a particular 
manufacturer. 
The degree of intrabrand competition is 
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wholly independent of the l .evel of interbrand competition 
confronting the manufacturer. Thus, there may be fierce 
intrabrand competition among the distributors of a product 
produced by a monopolist and no intrabrand competition 
among the distributors of a product produced by a firm in 
a highly competitive industry. But when interbrand 
competition exists, as it does among television 
manufacturers, it provides a significant check on the 
exploitation of intrabrand market power because of the 
ability of consumers to substitute a different brand of 
the same product . 
. 20/ The Court did not specifically refer to 
intrabrand competition, but this meaning is clear from the 
context. 
21/ The Court also stated that to impose 
vertical restrictions in sale transactions would "vi6late 
the ancient rule against restraints on alienation." 388 
U.S., at 380. This isolated reference has provoked sharp 
criticism from virtually all of the commentators on the 
decision, most of whom have regarded the Court's apparent 
reliance on the "ancient rule" as both a misreading of 
' 
legal history and a perversion of antitrust analysis. 
See, ~~, Handler, .§~:era n. 13, at 1684-1686; Posner, 
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supra n. 13, at 295-296; Robinson, ~Ea n. J3, at 271; 
but see Louis, supra n. 13, at 276 n. 6. We quite agree 
with MR. JUSTICE STEWART's dissenting comment in Schwinn 
that "the state of the common law 400 or even 100 years 
ago is irrelevant to the issue before us: the effect of 
the antitrust laws upon vertical distributional restraints 
in the American economy today." 388 U.S., at 392. 
We are similarly unable to accept Judge 
Browning's argument in his dissent below that the Sherman 
Act was intended to prohibit restrictions on the autonomy 
of independent businessmen ~ven though the restrictions 
have no impact on "price, quality, and quantity of goods 
and services." 537 F.2d, at 1019. Competitive economies 
have social and political as well as economic advantages, 
see, e.g., Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 
U.S., at 4, but an antitrust policy divorced from market 
considerations would lack any objective benchmarks. As 
Justice Brandeis reminded us, "Every agreement concerning 
trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to 
restrain is of their very essence." Chicago Board of 
Trade v. United States, 246 u.s., at 238. 
22/ In that regard,' the Court specifically 
stated that a more complete prohibition "might severely 
hamper smaller enterprises resorting to reasonable methods 
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of meeting the competition of giants and merchandising 
through independent dealers." 388 u.s., at 380. The 
Court al.so broadly hinted that it would r~cognize 
additional exceptions to the ~ se rule for new entrants 
in an industry and for failing firms, both of which were 
mentioned in White Motor as candidates for such 
exceptions. Id..:..., at 374. The Court might have limited 
the exceptions to the E££ se rule to these situations, 
which present the strongest arguments for the sacrifice of 
intrabrand competition for interbrand competition. 
Significantly, it chose instead to create the more 
extensive exception for non-sale transactions which is 
available to all businesses, regardless of their size, 
financial health, or market share. This broader exception 
demonstrates even more clearly the Court's awareness of 
"redeeming virtues" of vertical restrictions. 
~/ Marketing efficiency is not the only 
legitimate reason for a manufacturer's desire to 
# 
exer~ontrol over the manner in which his products are 
sold and serviced. As a result of statutory and common 
law developments, society increasingly demands that 
manufacturers assume direct responsibility for the safety 
' 
and quality of their products. For example, at the 
federal level, apart from more specialized requirements, 
{/ 
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all manufacturers of consumer products have safety 
responsibilities under the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2051 et ~., and obligations for warranties 
under the Consumer Product Warranties Act, 15 u.s.c. § 
2301 et ~· Similar obligations are imposed by state 
law. See, e.g., California Civil Code§ 1709 et seq. The 
legitimacy of these concerns has been recognized in cases 
involving vertical restrictions. See, e.g., Tripol: Co. 
v. Wella Corp., ~£~ n. 14. 
24/ "Generally a manufacturer \vould prefer 
the lowest retail price possible, once its price to 
dealers has been set, because a lower retail price means 
increased sales and higher manufacturer revenues." Note, 
88 Harv. L. Rev. 636, 641 (1975) (footnote omitted). In 
this context, a manufacturer is likely to view the 
difference between the price at which it sells to its 
tV~ 
retailers and ~ ts price to the consumer as his 
I 
cost of 
distribution, ' which it would prefer to minimize. eusncv-) ~~ f\ \3)"0-.r 
25/ Professor Comanor argues that the 
promotional activities encouraged by vertical restrictions 
result in product differentiation and, therefore, a 
decrease in interbrand competition. This argument is 
flawed by its necessary assumption that a large part of 
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the promotional efforts resulting from vertical 
restrictions will not convey socially desirable 
information about product availability, price, quality and 
services. Nor is it clear that a ~ se rule would res~ : t 
in anything more than a shift to less efficient method of 
obtaining the same promotional effects. 
26/ We also note that ~ se rules in this 
area may work to the ultimate deteriment of the small 
businesmen who operate as franchisees. To the extent that 
a ~ se rule prevents a firm from using the franchise 
system to achieve efficiencies that it perceives as 
important to its successful operation, the rule creates an 
incentive for vertical integration into the distribution 
system., thereby eliminating to that extent the role of 
independent businessmen. See, e.g., Baker, supra n. 13, 
at 538; Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. Law. 669 (1969). 
27/ Continental's contention that balancing 
intrabrand and interbrand competitive effects of vertical 
restrictions is not a "proper part of the judicial 
function," Pet. Br., at 52, is refuted by Schwinn itself. 
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 
(1972), is not to the contrary, for it involved a 
horizontal restriction among ostensible competitors. 
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405 u.s., at 608. Cf. Warren, Economics of 
Closed-Territory Distribution, 2 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 
(No. 2), 111, 115 (1968). 
28/ There may be occ~sional problems in 
differentiating vertical restrictions from horizontal 
restrictions originating in agreements among the 
retailers. There is no doubt that restrictions in 
thefatter category would be illegal per~~, see, e.g., 
United ~tates v. General Motors Co~, 384 U.S. 127 
(1966); United State s v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 
596 (1972), and we do not regard the problems of proof as 
sufficiently great as to justify a Eer se rule. 
~/ The locat .ion restriction used by 
Sylvania was neither the least nor the most restrictive 
provision that it could have used. See ABA M6nograph 
No. 2, supra n. 14, at 20-25. But we agree that the 
implicit judgment in Schwinn that a ~ ~ rule based on 
the nature of the restriction is, in general, 
undesirable. Although distinctions can be drawn among the 
frequently used restrictions, we are inclined to view them 
as differences of degree and form. See Robinson, su~ n. 
13, at 279; Averill, Sealy, Schwinn and Sherman One: An 
Analysis and Prognosis, 15 N.Y.L.~. 39, 65 (1969). We are 
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unable to perceive sjgnificant social gain from 
channelling transactions into one form or another. 
Finally, we agree with the Court in Schwinn that tbe 
advantages of vertical restrictions should not be limited 
to the categories of new entrants and failing firms. 
Sylvania was faltering, if not failing, and we think it 
would be unduly artificial to deny it the use of valuable 
competitive tools. 
30/ The importance of stare decisis is, of 
course, unquestioned, but as Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
stated in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940): 
"star~ decisis is a principle of policy and not a 
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, 
however recent and questionable, when such adherence 
involves collision with a prior doctrine more embrancing 
in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by 
experience." 
